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INTRODUCTION
This thesis covers several aspects related to regulation, information and liquidity on
equity markets. One of the main purposes of regulation in equity markets is to pro-
mote investors’ conﬁdence in markets by increasing fairness. The Dutch Authority
for the Financial Markets states on its website that "Conﬁdence in the fair and or-
derly operation of those markets is vital.1" In order to do this, regulation prohibits
price manipulations on the markets and ensures that no one trades with privileged
information.
What is information in equity markets? The future is inherently uncertain. More-
over, in all ﬁrms some decisions are taken by the management team that are kept
secret. This information is potentially valuable if a person was allowed to trade upon
it. Financial markets regulations stipulate that any person shall refrain from trading
upon “private” and “price-sensitive" information. Private information means an in-
formation not known to outside investors or to the public. Price-sensitive information
refers to an information that would have a signiﬁcant impact on the stock price were
it to be released to the public.
This regulation is enforced by obliging people that have access to such private
and price-sensitive information to disclose all their trades. By reporting their trades
to the regulator, it can be veriﬁed ex post whether speciﬁc information was used of
not. Those who are obliged to report their trades are managers of listed companies,
together with members of their family. Not only their trades have to be reported to
the regulator, but they are also made public in a registry of insider trading that is
accessible to anyone on the Internet.2
1http://www.afm.nl/en/over-afm.aspx. Page visited on January 24th, 2011.
2The Dutch registry is accessible by following this link:
http://www.afm.nl/en/professionals/registers/alle-huidige-registers.aspx?
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Even if corporate insiders are not allowed to trade shares upon private and mate-
rial information, they still have a more precise idea about the ﬁrm’s future prospects
compared to outside investors. This type of information does not qualify as private
and price-sensitive, and corporate insiders are allowed to trade upon such soft infor-
mation. Of course, insiders might also have other motives to trade their company’s
stocks which is not related to information. These trades are called “liquidity trades".
But it is not observable whether a trade is liquidity or information motivated.
In this context, the purpose of the ﬁrst chapter is two-fold. First, I measure what is
the information content of insiders’ trades on the Dutch stock market. Second, I test
whether a new regulation implemented in 2005, namely the Market Abuse Directive,
had an effect on the information content of insiders’ trades.
The second chapter of the thesis deals with the effect of insiders’ trades on stock
market liquidity. Liquidity is deﬁned, broadly speaking, as the ability to make large
trades in shares quickly without moving prices. Market liquidity can be measured in
several ways. The bid-ask spread is one measure of liquidity. This spread is the price
difference between a buy order and a sell order. A wide bid-ask spread means that
there is a large price difference between buying and selling shares. The consequence
is that the cost of doing a round-trip trade is high, even if the fundamental value of
the stock does not change. In the microstructure literature, it is shown that a deter-
minant of the bid-ask spread is information asymmetry among traders. Indeed, on
electronic stock markets like Euronext Amsterdam, liquidity is endogenously deter-
mined by market participants. If market participants are afraid to be picked off by
more informed traders, they will increase the price at which they stand ready to sell
shares and lower the price for buying shares. Now, since corporate insiders are more
informed than other market participants, their presence on the stock market impacts
stock liquidity by widening the bid-ask spread. This effect is what I aim to measure.
More speciﬁcally, in the second chapter, I perform three main tests of the infor-
mation effect of insiders’ trades on the stock market. First, I test whether in average,
ﬁrms with a larger incidence of insider trading have different stock liquidity than
other stocks. Second, I test whether liquidity is reduced around days where insiders
trade. Finally, I test the impact of the Market Abuse Directive, implemented in 2005,
whether it decreases the effect of insider trading on liquidity.
Liquidity is a very important issue for ﬁnancial markets. A liquid market allows
investors to trade more shares, and thus to hold stocks according to their needs. A
low liquid market impedes trading, and as such it can be seen as a cost to market
participants because it prevents them to hold and trade the exact amount of shares
they need. Thus, liquidity affects the risk sharing role of ﬁnancial markets in the
economy. It is therefore important to study market design and analyze the impact of
market rules on liquidity. This is the topic that is investigated in the third chapter of
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this thesis.
For this purpose, I focus on Euronext Paris, and I analyze the impact of the up-
stairs market for large trades on liquidity of the main market. Indeed, in Euronext
stock markets, like in many stock markets around the world, there is a main trading
platform were traders meet, and there is a parallel market for very large trades. This
parallel market is called the upstairs market for block trades. Investors needing to
trade a large amount of shares of a given stock have the choice of going to the main
market and to match their order with other orders from other market participants, or
to contact of broker and to negotiate the trade of a large block of shares. It is not well
understood how this upstairs market for block trades affects liquidity on the main
market.
Thegoal ofthe thirdchapteris thustoanalyze theimpact oftradingon theupstairs
market on liquidity of the main market. To achieve this, I use two main approaches.
First, I test whether in average, stocks that have a large and active upstairs market are
more liquid than other stocks. Second, I look on a daily basis whether a larger amount
of trading on the upstairs market is related to an increase or a decrease in liquidity
of the main market. The econometric setup allows to take into account serial depen-
dences in the daily measures: liquidity, trading and returns are not independent from
a day to another, and it is important to take this dependence into consideration in
order to pin down the effect of trading on liquidity.CHAPTER2
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE
NETHERLANDS1
Abstract
In this chapter, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed ﬁrms
to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a stan-
dard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around
trades. We ﬁnd that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns.
This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capital-
ization ﬁrms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an
important channel through which information ﬂows to the market. We analyze also
the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union
Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands.
We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top
executives.
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, countries worldwide have put into practice regulations against trad-
ing based on private information, from what it seems a consensus within the regula-
1This chapter is co-authored by professors Hans Degryse and Frank de Jong. We would like to thank
the Dutch ﬁnancial markets supervisor (AFM) for providing the data. Comments by Reinier Pollmann,
Paul-Willem van Gerwen, Bas ter Weel and Edo Lubbers are appreciated. We thank as well Mathias
Hoffmann, Christoph Nagel and participants at the CESifo conference on Financial Market Regulation
in Europe, the ENTER annual meetings, NAKE annual meetings, as well as seminar participants at the
TILEC-AFM seminar and VU Amsterdam. Hans Degryse is a CESifo research fellow and holds the
TILEC-AFM Chair on Financial Market Regulation.
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tory bodies that insider trading should be banned (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).
In the Netherlands, the current principles of law concerning securities trading, in line
with the directives of the European Union on market manipulation and market abuse,
stipulate that anyone in possession of private and price-sensitive information is not al-
lowed to trade. Within this framework, legal insider trading, i.e. trading in one’s own
company’s stock, is allowed provided that the trader is not in possession of such in-
formation. In addition, corporate insiders have to report their trades to a national
registry of insider trading.
Eventhoughtheirinformationmightnotqualifyas“private”and“price-sensitive”
when they trade, insiders may have more in-depth knowledge about the prospects of
their company compared to other market participants. This information can manifest
itself through abnormal stock price movement around their trades. In this paper,
we investigate how important these price movements are, as well as the effect of
regulation changes on these abnormal returns.
We measure empirically the short-term effects on the stock price when insiders
trade, using the national registry of insider trading from the AFM (the Authority for
the Financial Markets, the Dutch regulatory body in charge of the supervision of ﬁ-
nancial markets). We aim to answer the question whether insiders are trading upon
special information, or mostly for liquidity reasons. We use one month to one and
a half month return after trading date, instead of the very short-term effect (e.g. one
or two days) in order to capture the total effect of insider trading and not merely a
market reaction to a signal, as new information might take time to be impounded into
stock prices. This information content is measured by abnormal returns, estimated by
the standard event study methodology.
Our dataset spans a long time period, from 1999 to 2008. The Netherlands is one
of the countries in continental Europe with the longest history of insider trading reg-
ulation and reporting of trades in a public registry. Our study differs from other
insider trading studies since we focus on individual trades, as opposed to aggregated
purchases or sales. Also, in a cross-sectional regression framework, we study the
information content of trades by controlling for both trade characteristics and ﬁrm-
level characteristics. This allows us to determine which trades are mostly information
driven, and which are not. In doing so, we distinguish between trades that follow the
exercise of employee stock options from trades in shares only.
Another important contribution of this paper is testing the effect of changes in in-
sider trading regulations that occurred since the start of the insider trading registry
in 1999. The ﬁrst registration regime in effect until 2002 concerned all insiders. They
had to notify their trades into a single public registry without distinction of position
in the ﬁrm. Starting from September 2002, top executives had to register separately,
so that we can identify the effect of their trades relative to the trades of other insiders.
In 2005, the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) was in-
corporated into Dutch law. As a consequence, the penalty for illegal insider tradingCHAPTER 2 7
was increased for top executives, and the notiﬁcation delay was reduced for other
insiders. These three regulation regimes are studied in a regression framework that
allows controlling for confounding factors.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Legal trades by corporate insiders
indeed reveal information to the market. Moreover, trades by insiders that are higher
in the hierarchy of the ﬁrm have larger effects than trades by other insiders, especially
for share purchases. In average, these purchases by top executives are followed by a
risk-adjusted abnormal return of 2% in the month following the purchase date, which
is economically very large. It is in a same order of magnitude as other similar studies
in European countries such as Germany and Italy, but higher than studies in U.K. and
U.S. Trades in shares have more information content than trades following the exer-
cise of employee stock options. In addition, insiders have a good timing ability: they
buy after a price decrease and sell after a price increase.
Overall our results show that in average, insiders are more informed than other
market participants, even though this informational advantage is not reﬂected in each
single trade. As such, trading by insiders can be analyzed to learn about the funda-
mental value of stocks. This is consistent with insider trading being an important
channel of information ﬂow from the company to the market.
In testing the impact of a change in regulation, we ﬁnd that the Market Abuse
Directive implemented in 2005 had no effect on the information content of share pur-
chases. Holding other factors constant, top executives’ purchases are still followed
by positive abnormal returns. The only signiﬁcant effect of this regulation change is a
reduction in the information content of insiders’ sales. These trades are now followed
by less negative abnormal returns.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the related
literature. Readers who want to go to our results directly can skip this section. In
Section 2.3, we explain the essentials of insider trading regulation in the Netherlands.
Section 2.4 presents a description of the data used and the methodology. Section 2.5
presents the results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Although many asset pricing and market microstructure models are based on infor-
mation asymmetry, very few theoretical papers have looked on the speciﬁc aspect of
informed traders having to disclose their trades. To our knowledge, only two papers
address directly the question from a theoretical perspective: Huddart et al. (2001) and
Buffa (2008). Both papers build a theoretical model inspired by Kyle (1985) in which
informed traders have to disclose their trades, thus the market maker can ex post dis-
tinguish between the order ﬂow of informed traders and noise traders. When this
trading game is repeated, the authors show that the well known Kyle (1985) equilib-
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traders to submit trading demand with a random component. In this case, the market
maker cannot exactly infer the information content of the trade. This feature of the
model is consistent with what is found in empirical studies about legal insider trad-
ing. Since insiders have to disclose their trades ex post, they will trade in a fashion
such that it is very difﬁcult to infer the extent of their information. By doing so, they
will submit some trades that are uninformed, as if they were based on liquidity needs
or diversiﬁcation. They will post as well some informed trades, so that in average the
information content of the trades is small.
On the contrary to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature on legal in-
sider trading is sizable. Pioneered by Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), the literature
that followed aimed as investigating a wide array of research questions: information
content of insiders’ trades (Eckbo and Smith, 1998, Friederich et al., 2002, Jeng et al.,
2003, Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Seyhun, 1986, 1988); market efﬁciency and insider
trading (Aktas et al., 2008, Rozeff and Zaman, 1988, 1998); corporate governance is-
sues (Betzer and Theissen, 2009, Cziraki et al., 2010, Fidrmuc et al., 2006, Ravina and
Sapienza, 2010). It has been shown that insider purchases are generally followed by
positive stock returns, and insider sales are followed by negative stock returns, al-
though in a lower magnitude than for purchases. The present paper stands in the
vein of measuring the information content of insiders’ trades using the event study
methodology, applied to the Dutch market, both to document this feature using re-
cent data and to evaluate the effect of a new legislation, the Market Abuse Directive,
concerning insider trading.
The methodology used in the above cited papers is of two different kinds. The
strandofliteratureoninformationcontentofinsiders’tradesusesmostlyanapproach
that consists of constructing portfolios based on trades by insiders and then comput-
ing performance measures, assuming a holding periods of several months. In the
market efﬁciency literature, as well as in the corporate governance literature, the vast
majority of papers use the standard event study methodology to measure abnormal
returns following legal trades by corporate insiders. Most of the papers use a very
short event window of one to ﬁve days.
We now look more closely at results reported by relevant papers in the literature.
For the US market, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) compute abnormal returns as excess
returnsoverthemarketreturn. Withaneventwindowofﬁvedaysaroundthetrading
date, they obtain positive abnormal returns both for purchases (0.59%) and for sales
(0.17%). They report that the abnormal returns around the reporting date are not
signiﬁcant. This means that the market reacts to insider trading in a period close
to the trading date, and not on the date the information was reported. This result
ﬁnds an echo in other papers of the literature as well. They also report that abnormal
returns depend on ﬁrm size and on book-to-market ratio: purchases are followed by
larger (lower) abnormal returns for small (large) ﬁrms and for high (low) book-to-
market ratio.CHAPTER 2 9
A recent study of insider trading in the UK was done by Fidrmuc et al. (2006), with
data from the end of the 1990s. The authors are interested in analyzing the short-term
market reaction to insider trading conditional on ownership structure and corporate
governance. For this reason, they use event windows from two to ﬁve days only.
The results of their event study is that purchases and sales are followed by signiﬁcant
abnormal returns of the expected sign. When differentiating between trades sizes,
they ﬁnd that large trades confer larger abnormal returns for purchases. For sales, the
difference in CAR is small.
Turning to continental Europe, legal insider trading has been studied for the Ger-
man market. Betzer and Theissen (2009) use a dataset that spans from July 2002 to
June 2004, and similarly to the preceding paper, they analyze the effect of corporate
governance on insider trading behavior. Similar to the Dutch case, reporting delay
of insiders varies a lot. Although the law stipulates that insiders have to report their
trades without delay, more than half of their sample report after two days, and 7.6%
of the trades are reported more than 30 days late. Note also that on the contrary to
the Dutch regulations, in Germany insiders do not have to respect a blackout period,
i.e. a period before major news, like earnings announcements, where insider trading
is banned. The authors ﬁnd very large abnormal returns after insider trading, and
suggest that they are due to trades made before such earnings announcements. The
CARs have a magnitude of more than 2% in absolute value for both purchases and
sales in a 11-day window including the trade day, and of 3.4% to 4.4% using large
trades only.2 On a larger event window of 21 days, they obtain 6% abnormal returns
for purchases and almost -5% abnormal returns for sales.
For the Italian market, a paper by Bajo and Petracci (2006) shows that legal insider
trades are followed by high abnormal returns, in the order of 3.18% 10 days following
purchases and -3.67% for sales. They use about 4 years of data between 1998 and 2002.
In a 5-week post-trade event window, the cumulative abnormal returns for purchases
reach 7.29%, but is mainly driven by trades made by insiders owning more than 50%
of all the shares outstanding of their company. Their results show as well that there
is an asymmetry of response in terms of CAR for purchases and sales, with respect to
the insider’s holdings prior to the trade. Insiders owning between 30% and 50% of
the shares have negative or no abnormal returns after their purchases, but very high
negative abnormal returns after their sales. By contrast, insiders that own more than
50% of the shares of the company have high and positive abnormal returns after their
purchases, but relatively low negative abnormal returns following their sales.
Another study is made for the Spanish market. The paper is by Del Brio et al.
(2002) and uses 5 years of data from 1992 to 1996. The speciﬁcity of the Spanish no-
tiﬁcation duty is that insiders have to report the reason for trading their company’s
shares, which is not the case in the Dutch legislation. That makes it possible for the
2Their deﬁnition of large trades is trade value that is more than 0.1% of the value of all shares out-
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authors to remove transactions by insiders that are arguably not made upon informa-
tion, like inheritance, bonus and gifts. In addition, the authors use non contaminated
estimation windows. Their results are that there is a small but statistically signiﬁ-
cant abnormal return on the trading day itself, even though the trade was not yet
announced to the public. For purchases, the 2-day CAR is not signiﬁcant, but the 2-
day CAR for sales is positive and signiﬁcant (0.37%), which is another example of this
unexplained positive reaction to insider sales.
There are two papers which study legal insider trading on the Dutch stock market.
The ﬁrst is by Biesta et al. (2004). Although the aim of their paper is to assess the prof-
itability of insider’s portfolio based on a holding period of six months, they provide
as well results on short term stock price movement after insider trading. Their data is
from 1999 to 2003, and unlike us, they do not differentiate between top executives and
other insiders. They use event study analysis and keep only non-overlapping event
windows, further reducing their sample size. On a 21-day event window (i.e. from
day zero to day 20), they obtain a signiﬁcant 2.2% average cumulative abnormal re-
turn for purchases. On a smaller event window, their CARs are positive but not sig-
niﬁcant. On the contrary, for sales, they obtain signiﬁcant negative CARs for shorter
event windows (-2.8% from day zero to day 10) but not for longer windows.
The second study with Dutch data, Aktas et al. (2007), uses a similar dataset as
ours, although less complete.3 The authors use a market-adjusted model to compute
CARs around insider trades, not differentiating between top executives and other in-
siders. They ﬁnd very small abnormal returns of less than 0.4% for purchases and
almost -0.2% for sales, in a three day event window, including the transaction day.
With such a small event window, a large proportion of the trades are not yet made
public. So it is not clear what causes the abnormal returns. Our paper improves on
this paper by using a cross-sectional regression to analyze the determinants of the
abnormal returns.
It is worth mentioning that some papers ﬁnd that insiders tend to trade as con-
trarians by buying shares in value stocks and selling shares in growth stocks (Jenter,
2005, Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). This means that book-to-market value is an important
control variable in explaining the abnormal returns to insider trading.
A strand of insider trading literature focuses on the exercise of employee stock
options, and relate the behavior on information. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) ﬁnds
that the execution of large stock options by top executives is related to disappointing
future earnings announcements. Huddart and Lang (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with large
employee stock option exercises have larger future returns than companies with low
option exercises. Recently, Cziraki et al. (2010) show that the information content of
option exercises, as well as legal insider trading, depends not only of shareholder
3The public registry of insider trading in the Netherlands available on the AFM website does not
contain trades by former insiders and ﬁrms that are not public anymore (because of merger, bankruptcy,
etc.) Thanks to our collaboration with the AFM, we use the full insider trading database.CHAPTER 2 11
monitoring, but also on corporate governance mechanisms related to shareholder
rights.
To summarize, the literature ﬁnds in general that insider purchases are mostly
informed, whereas insider sales are mostly liquidity or diversiﬁcation motivated, and
thus not (or less) informed. In general, studies from the US and the UK have weaker
results in the sense that the abnormal returns are smaller in absolute value, and less
signiﬁcant. Studies about European countries have larger abnormal returns, in the
order of magnitude of a monthly 2%, for insider purchases (Netherlands and Spain),
which is in line with our results. For Germany and Italy, the abnormal returns are
much higher: about 7%. It is argued that in Germany insiders are not prevented to
trade in advance of important information events, and in Italy, the results are driven
by very large shareholders that control 50% or more of the shares.
The next section develops on the Dutch regulation concerning insider trading.
2.3 Regulation
Since March 2002, the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) supervises Dutch
ﬁnancial markets. The AFM is responsible for the market supervision and the appli-
cation of the different laws regulating conduct of ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial
markets. One of its duties is to supervise insider trading and to maintain a public
registry of all transactions made by corporate insiders of listed companies. Insider
trading is regulated in the Netherlands since 1987 (see Kabir and Vermaelen, 1996).
Dutch laws on insider trading mainly implement E.U. directives, in particular the
Insider Dealing Directive 89/592/EEC and its successor, the Market Abuse Direc-
tive 2003/6/EC. The principles of law concerning insider trading are similar to those
found in the US or in the UK: it is forbidden for all market participants to trade ac-
cording to private and price-sensitive information. Private information means infor-
mation that is not publicly available to the market. Price-sensitive information means
an information that is likely to affect the price of the company’s stock. Examples of
such information are ﬁnancial results or merger negotiation.
In addition to the prohibition of trade based on private information, there is the
obligation for insiders to report their trades on their company’s stock. Here, insid-
ers are deﬁned as directors, managers, members of the supervisory board, employees
and member of staff that are in contact with potentially private, price-sensitive infor-
mation, as well as their spouse/partner and children living with them. The law stip-
ulates that every listed company should have a written set of rules of conduct that
speciﬁes among other things when an insider is not allowed to trade (the so-called
blackout periods). The notiﬁcation duty concerns trades in shares or in any other
standardized instruments for which the value depends on the value of the share. This
includes employee stock options.
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registered in the Netherlands (even if they are not listed in Euronext Amsterdam).
Included are as well all companies (be it European of foreign) that have ﬁnancial
instruments listed on Euronext Amsterdam.
2.3.1 Act of the Supervision of Securities Trade 1995
FromApril1999untilSeptember2006, thereweretwomainactsthatregulatedinsider
trading. The ﬁrst is called the Act of the Supervision of the Securities Trade 1995 (or
Wte 1995). In 1999, some provisions concerning the notiﬁcation of insiders’ trades
and the disclosure of these trades in the public registry were added.4 At that time, the
rules speciﬁed that the reporting by insiders should be no later than ten days after the
end of the month in which the trade occurred.5
2.3.2 Act of the Disclosure of Major Holdings 1996
The second set of rules concerning insider trading are those arising from the Act of
the Disclosure of Major Holdings and Capital Interests in Securities-Issuing Institu-
tions 1996 (or Wmz 1996). This act obliged all major shareholders to disclose the level
of their holding. In October 2002, a new provision in this act came into effect and con-
cerned the disclosure of the holding and voting rights by directors and members of
the supervisory board (what we call Top executives for simplicity. We call the insiders
not in this category Other insiders.) Top executives had still to notify the AFM of their
trades but the information was disclosed to the public by the AFM through a different
registry. They had to report their trades as soon as possible, without delay. This Act
expired in October 2006 and was replaced by another one with similar provisions.
2.3.3 The Market Abuse Decree 2005
In October 2005, the European Market Abuse Directive6 was incorporated into Dutch
law as the Market Abuse Decree that modiﬁes the Wte 1995. This directive is con-
cerned by market abuse in general and has the aim of increasing market integrity and
conﬁdence. The provisions relating to insider trading have the effect of increasing
substantially the penalties to illegal insider trading. In addition, the legal reporting
delay for other insiders is brought to ﬁve working days after the date of the transac-
tion. However, notiﬁcations can be delayed until the moment that the value of the
transactions reach or exceed the amount of A C5,000 in the calendar year in question.
The implication is that if this A C5,000 threshold is not reached in a particular calendar
year, no notiﬁcation need be sent. Also, insiders do not have to report acquisitions of
4Cf. Rules on the Notiﬁcation and Regulation of Securities Transactions 1999.
5Id., Section 4.
6Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).CHAPTER 2 13
Table 2.1: Summary of the insider trading regulations
This table gives an overview of the relevant articles of law regulating insider trading in the Netherlands.
Top executives
Date Act–Article Content
Sept. 2002 Wmz 1996 – Art. 2a Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: immediately after the trade
Nov. 2006 Wmz 2006 – Art. 16 New legislation, but the rules are the same.
Other insiders
Date Act–Article Content
Apr. 1999 *Wte 1995 – Art. 46b Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: 10 days after the end of the
month
Oct. 2005 Wte 1995 – Art. 47a Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: 5 working days or until the
total value of trades reaches A C5,000. In any case, notiﬁcation
has to be done before the end of the calendar year.
Oct. 2005 Market Abuse Decree 2005 –
Art. 2
Exceptions to the notiﬁcation:
a) if shares are given to the insider as part of employee
scheme in doing a constant course of action;
b) exercising options granted by employee scheme on the
expiration date or within 5 working days prior to the
expiration date;
c) if the shares obtained are sold, there is an exception on the
prohibition if there was a written note made on the subject at
least 4 months before the expiry date.
*Note that between April 1999 and September 2002, all insiders had to notify their trades according to
this provision, including directors and members of supervisory boards.
shares or other instruments as part of a regular employee compensation scheme. The
exception extends to the sale of shares acquired by exercising employee stock options
as part of a scheme, if the exercise was made at the day of expiry or ﬁve working
days prior to expiry and if there was a written note made by the insider at least four
months in advance that revealed its intention to sell the shares so obtained.
Table 2.1 summarizes the main provisions of the law and tracks the changes made
in time.
The next section explains more precisely the data and methodology used. The
results follow.
2.4 Data and methodology
We have access to two different insider trading databases. The ﬁrst one includes
trades from top executives, such as directors and members of the supervisory board,
as prescribed by Article 2a of Wmz 1996. We call this database “Top executives". En-
tries in this dataset go from September 2002 until December 2007, inclusive. The sec-14 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
ond dataset includes trades from what we call “Other insiders", i.e. corporate insiders
that are not part of the management board or the supervisory board. This registry
is based on Sections 46b and 47a of Wte 1995, and includes trades from April 1999
until June 2008, inclusive. Note that before September 2002, top executives’ trades are
included in the “Other insiders” database without distinction.
From both databases, we use trades of shares and employee stock options, and
ﬁrms that are listed in the Netherlands that have price history available from Datas-
tream. We discard investment funds, leaving us with a total of 149 listed ﬁrms.
The data can be analyzed according to two different levels of aggregation. The
concept of “company-day" is a day when a company has insider trading. If at a given
date, two or more insiders from the same company report trades, we group them into
one trade. The direction of this trade (i.e. whether it is a buy or a sell) is determined
by aggregating the trades. If more shares are sold than bought, the event is classiﬁed
as a sell, and vice versa. In addition, we use “insider-day” events, i.e. days when a
given insider trades. In the above example, there would be two observations. This is
the least aggregated level insider trading.
For the univariate analysis, we use company-days events. But later, in the mul-
tivariate analysis, we use insider-days events to capture the effect of insider-speciﬁc
characteristics on the information content of trades.
Table 2.2 shows the number of observations according to the two levels of aggre-
gation. We have overall 1,654 different insiders that reported trades. The number of
insider-days events is 5,761. Aggregating to company-days events gives us a total of
3,612 observations. Notice that the number of insider-days is larger than the number
of company-days. This shows that insiders from a given company trade often on the
same day (but not necessarily on the same side).7
The main hypotheses of this paper are tested using the event study methodology.
We choose to measure abnormal returns around date of insiders’ trades, instead of
the reporting date, because it has been shown in the literature (notably in Lakonishok
and Lee, 2001) that the market starts reacting at the trading date, and that abnormal
returns around announcement dates are weaker. Results in Aktas et al. (2008) using
intraday data show that there are informational effects measurable on insider trad-
ing dates. In fact, a large part of the papers with similar methodology focuses on
the trading date, or to both trading date and reporting date (Aktas et al., 2007, Bajo
and Petracci, 2006, Betzer and Theissen, 2009, Biesta et al., 2004, Cziraki et al., 2010,
Del Brio et al., 2002).8 Also, Betzer and Theissen (2010) scrutinize the reporting delay
7Most, if not all of the empirical literature about insider trading use aggregated measures of insider
trading. Some authors use company-days events, some discard company-days where insiders traded in
different directions, because it is interpreted as a conﬂicting signal. Some papers use company-months
events. The beneﬁt of using de-aggregated data is to analyze the effect of insider or trade-speciﬁc char-
acteristics, which is not possible when many trades and insiders are aggregated.
8An exception is Fidrmuc et al. (2006).CHAPTER 2 15
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
This table shows some descriptive statistics of the combined dataset of insider trading. The trades for
which notiﬁcation delay exceeds 90 calendar days are discarded.
Category Number of Number of Number of Number of
Companies Insiders Company-Days Insiders-Days
Top executives
Shares 117 416 1152 1869
Options 65 192 330 464
Other insiders
Shares 127 899 1493 2174
Options 70 617 830 1254
All 149 1654 3612 5761
of insider trades, and they conclude that insiders have the incentive to report their
trade after the information has been impounded into prices so that no abnormal re-
turns can be earned by following their trades. In any case, since we are interested
in the informational content of insiders’ trades, we want to capture the total effect of
insider trading that includes price movements on the trade date, not only the post-
announcement effect.
WefollowthemethodoutlinedinCampbelletal.(1997). Inthispartofthemethod-
ology, we use company-day events because the ex post performance of a given stock
is the same whether there is one or many insiders who trade during that day. The
time line of the event study is described in Figure 2.1. The event, i.e. a trade by an
insider, occurs at period Te. In order to calculate the abnormal returns, we need to es-
timate the parameters of the predictive model. These parameters are estimated in the
estimation window, which occurs before the event, from time period T0 until but ex-
cluding period T1 (n observations). Once the parameters are estimated, the abnormal
returns are calculated during the so-called event window, from period T1 to period
T2. There are m periods in the event window, including periods that are prior to the
actual event. In this paper, we use n = 250 trading days as estimation period, and
m = 51 trading days as event period (the event day itself, plus 20 and 30 trading days
before and after then event, respectively).16 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
Figure 2.1: Timing of an event study
This ﬁgure shows the time line of an event study. The event date is Te. The estimation of the benchmark
model uses n observations from date T0 until (but excluding) date T1. Abnormal returns are computed
for the m periods of the event window, which starts at date T1 and ends at date T2.
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As predictive model for the normal rate of return we use the market model (with
the AEX index return as a proxy for the market return). The parameters are estimated
by OLS with one year of data prior to the event window. To test the signiﬁcance of
the cumulative abnormal returns, we use the J2 test statistic of Campbell et al. (1997).9
For more detail on the event study methodology and the test statistic, see Appendix
2.A.
We measure the cumulative abnormal returns for an event window of 20 trading
days (i.e. approximately one calendar month) prior to the trade up to 30 trading days
after the event, thus for an event window of 51 days. The event date is the day of the
transaction – not the day at which the trade was made public. The signiﬁcance levels
arefromatwo-sidedtest. Weusecompany-dayobservations(i.e.whenmanyinsiders
from the same company trade during the same day, their trades are aggregated).
The second part of the empirical analysis is a cross-sectional regression of the cu-
mulative abnormal returns following insiders’ trades. We use insider-day observa-
tions and regress the individual CARs on a set of explanatory variables:
CAR = XG + e ,
where X is the matrix of regressors and G is the vector of the associated coefﬁcients.
e is the vector of error terms. We use robust standard errors that are corrected both
for clustering (same company, same date) and for heteroskedasticity between ﬁrms.
See Appendix 2.C for the details of the methodology regarding the robust standard-
deviations.
9The authors argue that the J2 statistic is more robust than their J1 when ﬁrms are heterogenous,
which is the case in our sample since there are large as well as very small stocks.CHAPTER 2 17
2.5 Results
In this section, we present the event study results. Subsection 2.5.1 shows how the av-
erage cumulative abnormal return varies with ﬁrm characteristics and insider type.
The CAR shown is for trades aggregated by company-date (buy or sell signal by a
ﬁrm for a given day). Subsection 2.5.2 studies in a regression framework the effect
of trade-speciﬁc and insider-speciﬁc variables, such as trade size, prior holdings and
notiﬁcation delay. For that analysis, we do not aggregate insider trades for a given
company on a given date, but rather we use insider-date observations. The results
will also give a different view on ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables because we control for char-
acteristics such as industry and reporting delay. The analysis will also help to study
the effect of regulatory regimes on the information content of insider trading.
All the variables used in the empirical analysis are deﬁned in Table 2.3.
We start the description of our empirical results by discussing the market reac-
tions around trades by all insiders. Figure 2.2 shows the average cumulative abnormal
return (or CAR) around purchases and sales by all insiders. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the number of days before and after the trade. Day zero is the event day, i.e. the
transaction day. The curves are normalized to have an average CAR of zero at day
 1, so that the curve at time t = 0 shows the event day effect. The graph shows
price movements before and after the trade as well. The markers show the two-sided
signiﬁcance of the average CAR (that is, a test that the effect is signiﬁcantly different
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Table 2.3: Variable deﬁnition
We deﬁne here the variables used in the cross-sectional regression. Variables followed by an asterisk ()
are available only for top executives.
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent Variables
CAR(0,20) Average cumulative abnormal return starting at day zero (the trading day) and ending day 20
(approx. 1 month).
CAR(0,30) Average cumulative abnormal return starting at day zero (the trading day) and ending day 30
(approx. 1 and a half month).
Explanatory Variables – Dummy Variables
Cluster Equals 1 if any insider from the same company traded stocks within a window of 1 week before
or after the trade.
Size groups
Small cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the smallest tercile group, based on market capitalization com-
puted at the beginning of each calendar year.
Mid cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the middle tercile group, based on market capitalization computed
at the beginning of each calendar year.
Large cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the largest tercile group, based on market capitalization computed
at the beginning of each calendar year.
Book-to-market groups
Growth ﬁrm Equals 1 if the company is in the tercile with the lowest book to market ratio. The companies in
the sample are ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Mid BM Equals 1 if the company is in the second book to market tercile. The companies in the sample are
ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Value ﬁrm Equals 1 if the company is in the tercile with the highest book to market ratio. The companies in
the sample are ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Notiﬁcation delay groups
Notiﬁcation in time Equals 1 if the notiﬁcation of the trade is done within the limits established by the regulations.
Late notiﬁcation Equals 1 if the notiﬁcation of the trade is made after the time limit established by regulation.
Top executive position groups
Board of directors Equals 1 if the insider is member of the board of directors.
Supervisory board Equals 1 if the insider is member of the supervirosy board.
Ownership groups
Financial Equals 1 if the largest shareholder with more than 5% of shares is a ﬁnancial ﬁrm (investment
fund, pension fund, broker, bank, etc.).
Holding+Corp.+Indiv. Equals 1 if the largest shareholder with more than 5% of shares is either a holding company, a
corporation, or an individual.
Government Equals 1 if the largest shareholder with more than 5% of shares is a government agency.
Widely held Equals 1 if no shareholder holds more than 5% of shares.
Explanatory Variables – Continuous Variables
Holdings  The holdings in shares of the insider prior to the trade. Holdings are deﬁned as the stake of the
insider as the proportion of the total number of shares outstanding. This variable is provided
only for trades in shares.
Volume The trade size in shares relative to the total number of shares outstanding.
Turnover The trade’s turnover in A C divided by the average daily turnover of the stock (computed at the
beginning of each calendar year).
ILLIQ MovingaverageofthemedianofAmihud’silliquiditymeasurefortheﬁrmsinthesampleduring
the calendar month preceding the trade. The illiquidity measure is the absolute return divided
by the euro value of the shares traded. See Equation 2.1. In the regression, this measure is
standardized for ease of interpretation of the coefﬁcient.CHAPTER 2 19
Figure 2.2: Trades of shares
The graph shows the average cumulative abnormal returns around purchases and sales of shares by
insiders. The two curves are normalized to be zero at day  1.













































































































































If we believe that insiders provide new information to the market when trading,
and that they have timing ability, the average CAR curve for purchases should have
a “V” shape with the spike at day zero. This would mean that insiders wait for the
right moment to buy shares (i.e. they wait for the price to be low), and this purchase
provides a positive signal to the market, which would make the price rise. This is
precisely what we observe for the trades in shares. In a window of one month prior
to purchases, we see that prices are decreasing by 1% on average (statistically signiﬁ-
cant). During the month and a half after purchases, the cumulative abnormal returns
are increasing very steadily by more than 2%. This is a sign of persistence of the daily
abnormal returns, which is conﬁrmed by the fact that the abnormal returns are typ-
ically more and more signiﬁcant the further we move from the trading date. They
start to be signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level from day 8 after the trade.
Concerning sales (dotted line of Figure 2.2), we see the opposite pattern, an in-
verted “V” shape: the price increase before the trade is quite strong and steady (about
-1.3%), and after the trade, we observe a decrease in prices of more than 2%, signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level. This means that even if sales are partly based on diversiﬁcation
and liquidity purposes, thus are less likely to confer new information, in average
they still are informative. Also, the sales take place at the right moment (after a price20 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
increase of about 1.3% on average). This shows the timing ability of insiders with
respect to sales of shares.
Figure 2.3 shows the CAR around the exercise of employee stock options, for all
insiders. We separated these option exercises in two categories: instances where in-
siders exercise their options and sell all their shares (exercise and sell), and instances
where insiders keep at least some of the shares obtained with the option (exercise
and keep). This latter category occurs rarely – only 108 times in the whole sample.
The rationale for separating these categories is that keeping (part of the) shares could
mean that insiders have positive information, whereas selling all shares could mean
negative information about the ﬁrm.
Figure 2.3: Exercise of employee stock options
The graph shows the average cumulative abnormal returns around exercises of employee stock options
by insiders, where insiders can sell all the shares, or they can keep at least part of the shares. The two
curves are normalized to be zero at day  1.













































































































































The results show that for both categories (exercise and keep, exercise and sell), the
abnormal returns are not signiﬁcant after the trade. This means that no information
is provided by these trades in average. But insiders still have a good timing ability:
they choose to exercise their options after a price increase. This timing is at its best
when insiders exercise and sell their shares: the price increase in the month prior to
the trade is close to 3%.CHAPTER 2 21
2.5.1 Insider types
Breaking down these results into different categories of insiders can help to understand
which trades are more important. Figure 2.4 shows the same graph, but for top exec-
utives and other insiders separately, and for trades of shares and exercise of options.
The top left graph shows that trades in shares by top executives are informative only
for purchases, for which abnormal returns cumulate to about 3.4%, 30 trading days
after the trade. Following sales, we observe negative abnormal returns of about 2.8%,
although less signiﬁcant than for purchases. Moreover, their timing ability seems to
be weak: the abnormal returns prior to the trade are close to zero. This means either
that top executives do not have timing ability, or that they do not have the freedom
to trade whenever they want. The results here cannot distinguish between these two
explanations.22 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
Figure 2.4: Category of insiders, shares and options
This ﬁgure shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and for
other insiders, and for trades in shares and exercise of employee stock options. In the case of options,
insiders can either keep the shares (convert the option), or sell the shares (liquidate the obtained shares).
The x axis shows the day relative to the trade day, which is day zero. The y axis shows the average
CAR in percentage points. All graphs are normalized such that the average CAR is zero at day -1. The
markers show the signiﬁcance level: circles, squares and triangles indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance
level, respectively.
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The top right graph of Figure 2.4 shows the average CAR for other insiders when
they trade in shares. We see that the information content of the trades is weak: the
curves do not show much statistical signiﬁcance in the post-trade window. But the
averages are of the “right” sign. In contrast, the CARs prior to the trades are veryCHAPTER 2 23
pronounced. Purchases are preceded by a signiﬁcant -2% abnormal return and sales,
by a 1.9% abnormal return, statistically signiﬁcant as well. This implies that other
insiders have the ability and freedom to choose the right moment for executing their
trades, but they cannot predict the price movement of the stocks.
Now for trades related to the exercise of employee stock options, we see by the
sample sizes that most of the time, insiders liquidate their shares when exercising op-
tions. This is consistent with diversiﬁcation, as they typically have already a large
stake in their company through their employment. The small sample sizes of exercise
and keep may explain also the low signiﬁcance level of the CARs, both for top exec-
utives and other insiders. But we can distinguish a certain pattern when exercising
the option and liquidating the shares. Both top executives and other insiders seem to
have good timing ability as the left part of the curves is signiﬁcantly negative.
2.5.2 Firm characteristics
Following the literature (see Section 2.2), we condition the abnormal returns on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables: market capitalization and book to market ratio. In the remaining,
we concentrate on a post-event window of 21 trading days for top executives, and
31 trading days for other insiders because of the longer reporting delay allowed for
the latter (see Section 2.3). The reason for this relatively long event window is that we
allow enough time for all information contained in insiders’ trades to be incorporated
in the stock price.
Theory predicts that large ﬁrms are typically more followed by analysts, so that
there should be less information asymmetry between management and investors. In
addition, the market for these companies is more liquid, so that large trades have less
price impact. By contrast, insider trades in small ﬁrms that are more opaque would
imply more information revelation. Table 2.4 shows the abnormal returns following
insider trading broken down into ﬁrm size terciles. We determine ﬁrm size every
year, on the 1st of January, by multiplying the stock price by the total number of shares
outstanding. Then, we separate ﬁrms into three quantiles: small caps, mid caps and
large caps. As expected, purchases by top executives in small companies have very
high and signiﬁcant abnormal returns. By contrast, purchases by top executives in
the large cap group provides almost no abnormal return. We also observe that sales
by both types of insiders in mid-size ﬁrms provide large negative abnormal returns,
but not in large ﬁrms.
The book to market ratio of a ﬁrm is known in the asset pricing literature to proxy
for the value anomaly. There is evidence from previous studies with U.S. data that
insiders act as contrarians (see e.g. Jenter, 2005): at an aggregate level, there are more
insider purchases in value ﬁrms and more insider sales in growth ﬁrms, thus explain-
ing in part the proﬁt made by insiders. It is thought that insiders have a better idea
of the growth opportunities of their companies and their trades can help to correct24 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
Table 2.4: Breakdown by size
This table shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and
for other insiders. Only trades of shares are used here, not trades related to exercises of employee
stock options. The event period is a 21 trading day period (beginning with the transaction day) for top
executives, and a 31 trading day period for other insiders. The average CAR is broken down into market
capitalization terciles. In each row, the ﬁrst number shows the average CAR, the second in brackets
shows the test statistic, and the third is the number of observations. ,  and  denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Firm size Top executives Other insiders
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Small caps 8.02% 0.75% 0.99% -5.12%
(4.22) (0.15) (0.50) (-0.37)
178 161 175 176
Mid caps 0.37% -3.03% 1.63% -3.72%
(-0.23) (-2.43) (-0.09) (-3.29)
231 139 235 405
Large caps 0.30% -1.43% 0.29% 1.53%
(1.24) (0.09) (1.58) (1.83)
399 136 366 326
All 1.97% -1.16% 0.83% -2.04%
(2.73) (-1.23) (1.28) (-1.27)
808 436 776 907CHAPTER 2 25
Table 2.5: Breakdown by book to market ratio
This table shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and for
other insiders. Only trades of shares are used here, not trades related to exercises of employee stock
options. The event period for top executives is a 21 trading day period beginning with the transaction
day. For other insiders, the event period spans 31 days including and after the trade. The CAR is broken
down into book to market terciles. At the beginning of January of each year, the book to market ratio of
ﬁrms in the sample is computed and ﬁrms are then separated into three groups. High book to market
is a proxy for value ﬁrms, low book to market is for growth ﬁrms. In each row, the ﬁrst number shows
the average CAR, the second number in brackets shows the test statistic, and the third is the number of
observations. ,  and  denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Book-to-market ratio Top executives Other insiders
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Value ﬁrms 5.33% 4.33% 2.39% 1.61%
(5.12) (1.35) (1.20) (0.49)
149 60 182 107
Medium 1.69% -3.44% 1.79% -0.13%
(0.64) (-2.68) (0.62) (0.55)
319 159 287 310
Growth ﬁrms 0.77% -0.85% -1.36% -4.27%
(0.20) (-0.16) (0.51) (-2.38)
340 217 307 490
All 1.97% -1.16% 0.83% -2.04%
(2.73) (-1.23) (1.28) (-1.27)
808 436 776 907
the expectations of the market, thus providing abnormal returns to their trades. Table
2.5 shows the CARs after trades by insiders, broken down into book to market ter-
ciles. Value ﬁrms are those that have a market price relatively small with respect to
the book value. If the company is indeed under-valued by the market, insiders’ pur-
chases should be followed by large abnormal returns. By contrast, growth ﬁrms are
those for which the stock price is high relative to the accounting value. If insiders sell
shares, the signal should be clear that the ﬁrm is over-valued by the market. In Table
2.5 we see that top executives that buy shares in value ﬁrms make indeed a large and
signiﬁcant abnormal return. In the same column, we also note that the average CAR
and the test statistic diminishes with the book to market ratio (i.e. going to Mid BM
ﬁrms and Growth ﬁrms). The pattern is less clear for sales by top executives. Their
sales do not predict future down turns for growth ﬁrms. Other insiders, on the other
hand, do not proﬁt from buying shares in value ﬁrms, but they do take advantage of
selling shares of growth ﬁrms before a down turn.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 showed an overview of some patterns of stock price movements
after insider trading, at the company level. Since there might be many other con-
founding factors that explain these patterns, in the next sub-section we will study the26 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
impact of insider trading in a regression framework.
2.5.3 Cross-sectional regression
As explained above, the cross-sectional regression framework allows us to use trade
information at the insider level, and to use individual and company characteristics. In
order to do so, we now use insider-day events, instead of company-day events. This
allows us to study the effect of trade-speciﬁc information, as well as company-speciﬁc
characteristics while controlling for other relevant factors.
ThedependentvariableoftheregressionisCAR(0,20)fortopexecutives, andCAR(0,30)
for other insiders (since the legal reporting delay is longer). This choice of event win-
dow is made because a shorter window would be most likely to capture market reac-
tions, which is shown in the literature to be partly a function of corporate governance
and ownership structure (see Fidrmuc et al., 2006). A longer event window is more
likely to capture the information content of the trades. Even if some papers show that
the information content of insider trading can be revealed in much longer time frames
(six months of more), the event study literature states that a too long event window
does not provide robust results, as parameters of the market model might change (see
e.g. Kothari and Warner, 1997). Another issue is that using a too long event window
increases the likelihood of having “contaminated event windows”, i.e. having other
insider trades during the length of time in which the CARs are computed.10
Many of the control variables that we use are dummy variables that represent
membership in a group. These groups are size terciles, book to market terciles, in-
dustry membership,11 regulatory regime, notiﬁcation delay groups, and ownership
groups. This last set of dummies is motivated by monitoring and corporate gover-
nance effects, as found in Betzer and Theissen (2009), Cziraki et al. (2010), Fidrmuc
et al. (2006).
To solve the dummy variable trap (i.e. exact multicolinearity), we use constrained
OLS estimation. This makes the results easier to interpret because we do not have
to take one group as a reference group. The constraints are such that the coefﬁcients
of every set of dummy variables must have a weighted average equal to zero. The
weights applied are the proportion of the observations in each group. With this spec-
iﬁcation, the coefﬁcient of the dummy variables gives the deviation from the overall
10Contaminated estimation windows are also a possible source of concern. Some papers in the litera-
ture use only insider trades that are not preceded by other trades (e.g. Biesta et al., 2004, Del Brio et al.,
2002), but this discards many observations. Betzer and Theissen (2009) perform a robustness check with
market adjusted returns (i.e. no estimation of alpha and beta in an estimation window, which annihilate
the contamination of estimation windows). They ﬁnd that results are very similar and they conclude
that using contaminated estimation windows does not lead to any bias; results are robust (p. 412).
11The industry groups are classiﬁed according the the ICB industry classiﬁcation. ICB stands for
Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark. It is created by Dow Jones and FTSE. There are ten industries in this
classiﬁcation framework. Information about the ICB industry of Dutch ﬁrms is taken from Datastream.CHAPTER 2 27
mean effect. Details about the constrained OLS used for the cross-sectional regression
are found in Appendix 2.B.
For top executives, we have access to the information concerning the holdings of
the insider before the trade. We use this information to control for the importance
of the stake the insider has in the ﬁrm. This might inﬂuence the signal given to the
market. Speciﬁcally, we use the proportion of all shares outstanding owned by the
insider. In addition, we control for the size of the trade. We use two alternative
variables to proxy for this: the relative volume and the relative turnover. The former
variable is deﬁned as the number of shares traded divided by the total number of
shares outstanding. The latter variable is the euro value of the trade divided by the
average daily euro turnover for the stock.12
We use a dummy variable “Cluster" to control for the trades that are closely fol-
lowed by other trades by the same company. The variable Cluster is equal to one
when any insider of a given company trades on the same side within one week of
interval before or after the current trade, and zero otherwise. For example, if two in-
siders of the same company buy shares in a given week, the Cluster dummy is equal
to one for both observations that come into the cross-sectional regression.13 The co-
efﬁcient of this variable will therefore capture whether insiders cluster their trades
when they trade upon information, or when they trade for liquidity reasons. The mo-
tivations for insiders to break large transactions into smaller trades might be either
for hiding informed trades (from the market or from regulators) or because there is a
lack of liquidity on the market. In the former case, clustered trades might reveal more
information than other trades; in the latter case, clustering trades might not reveal
information. This is what will be captured by the Cluster dummy variable.14
For exercise of options, the Cluster variable is deﬁned as trades in shares that are
done within one week before or after the exercise of the option, on the same side.
More precisely, if an insider exercises his stock option and sells the shares obtained,
the Cluster dummy would be equal to one if within a week, an insider of the same
ﬁrm sold shares. Similarly, when an insider buys shares within a week of a conversion
of option into shares, the Cluster dummy is equal to one.
Inadditiontoﬁrm-levelandindividualcharacteristics, weuseamarket-widechar-
acteristic that is not captured by the market model in the event study methodology.
It is known in the market liquidity literature that the level of liquidity affect ﬁrms’
returns (see e.g. Amihud, 2002, Chordia et al., 2000). In the time period in which our
sample takes place, there are periods of high liquidity and of low liquidity, and this
12The average daily euro turnover is computed every year for each stock.
13Alternative deﬁnitions of clusters (e.g. trade by the same insider, trades that are done within two
weeks instead of one week) were used (not shown here) and results where the same.
14Betzer and Theissen (2010) compare the post event CARs from all trades in their dataset with post-
event CARs from only the last trade in each cluster. They ﬁnd that the former is slightly smaller in
magnitude than the latter, but depicts the same general pattern. Overall, they ﬁnd that using all trades
is robust (p. 416).28 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
factor affects ﬁrms’ returns as well as abnormal returns to insider trading. The proxy
for market liquidity is a variable called ILLIQ (see Amihud, 2002). Our measure of
illiquidity is based on the median monthly illiquidity in the market. It is computed as
follows:










for each ﬁrm i, where d is the day of the month m (from 1 to D). rid is the log return
of day d. Vid is the number of shares traded during day d for ﬁrm i. From these ﬁrm-
speciﬁc monthly measures, we obtain a market-wide illiquidity measure by taking
the median ﬁrm in the month.
Regression results are presented in Table 2.8. Coefﬁcients for control dummy vari-
ables are shown in Table 2.9. In addition, we show some descriptive statistics of the
group dummies and regression variables in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.
The results are separated into insider type (top executives, other insiders) and
trade type (purchases, sales, exercise of options). For each, two speciﬁcations are
shown. The ﬁrst, called Model (1) uses as a measure of trade size the share volume
relative to the total number of shares outstanding. Model (2) uses euro volume rela-
tive to the average daily euro turnover.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Table 2.8 is that the intercept of all regressions is insignif-
icant.15 This is in contrast with the graphs showing unconditional averages of CARs,
above (Figure 2.2 and 2.4), where the average abnormal returns were large and sig-
niﬁcant. This means that some factors or characteristics are responsible for bringing
the CARfar from zero in Figures 2.2 and 2.4.
For top executives, their holdings of their company stock is an important factor
indicating information. The larger their holding in the company, the more their pur-
chases are related to future positive abnormal returns. This means either that execu-
tives with large holdings are more informed, or they refrain to buy new shares unless
their company has very good future prospects. For sales, the effect of holdings is of
the same sign and also signiﬁcant. We interpret this ﬁnding as follows: for purchases,
insiders with large holdings are those which are more likely to be informed, while
for sales, insiders with small holdings make more informed trades. This contrasts
with the results obtained in Fidrmuc et al. (2006) who document that CEOs with large
holdings send an entrenchment signal when they purchase more shares.16
15Notethattheexplanatoryvariablesarealldeviationsfromtheirmean. Thus, theinterceptrepresents
the average CAR for non clustered trades.
16The authors use information about the shareholder structure of the ﬁrms. In their regression, they
ﬁnd that purchases by CEOs that own a large stake in their ﬁrm produce a large abnormal return only
when there is another blockholder that acts as a monitor. If there is no active blockholder, the entrench-
ment is seen as a negative signal by the market and produces negative abnormal returns.CHAPTER 2 29
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions
– Shares
Variables used are deﬁned in Table 2.3.
Descriptive statistics
Top executives
Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
Holdings 0.8307 6.3408 -0.0091 0.0000 0.0004 0.0068 53.69
ILLIQ 1.1518 1.2543 0.1754 0.3109 0.5638 1.6286 4.8516
Volume 0.0092 0.0662 7.500E-9 2.205E-6 4.461E-5 4.667E-4 1.0000




Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 1.2264 1.0176 0.1754 0.4631 0.8684 1.6647 4.8516
Volume 0.0041 0.0387 4.352E-9 5.907E-6 6.419E-5 4.058E-4 1.0000







Volume 0.053 -0.001 1
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Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions
– Options
Variables used are deﬁned in Table 2.3.
Descriptive statistics
Top executives
Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 0.7207 0.8359 0.1754 0.2514 0.4665 0.7311 4.6227
Volume 1.034E-3 3.244E-3 8.255E-8 8.850E-5 3.326E-4 7.549E-4 0.0421




Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 0.8625 0.7087 0.1754 0.2852 0.5790 1.2886 4.4516
Volume 2.281E-4 6.418E-4 2.200E-8 1.543E-5 5.736E-5 2.076E-4 0.0104
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The ILLIQ variable helps to explain themagnitude of abnormal returns.For ease of
interpretation, the variable has been divided by its standard deviation. The coefﬁcient
is the increase in abnormal returns when illiquidity of the market increases by one
standard deviation. For top executives, this variable is signiﬁcant for all types of
trades. For purchases, the sign of the coefﬁcient is positive, meaning that purchases
in times of low market liquidity are followed by higher abnormal returns. This is
consistent with the hypothesis of information content of insider purchases. Indeed, if
liquidity is low, and thus implicit trading costs are high, an investor would require a
higher rate of return to compensate. Or, in other words, an insider would refrain to
trade unless the information content is high.
Interestingly, thesignoftheilliquiditycoefﬁcientisalsopositiveandsigniﬁcantfor
sales (only top executives). This means this variable has the opposite effect for sales
compared to purchases: sales in period of illiquid markets trigger higher (i.e. less neg-
ative, or even positive) abnormal returns.The effect is economically important: when
the market’s illiquidity increases by one standard deviation, the abnormal returns are
1.82% higher in average. This result can be explained by the timing ability in conjunc-
tion with the liquidity motivation for sales. In times of low liquidity, if insiders have
to sell, they will choose the right moment, e.g. after good news on the ﬁrm or when-
ever other market players need to buy. This is in line with the conjecture of Aktas
et al. (2008).
The variables that proxy for trade size give interesting results. For both top exec-
utives and other insiders share purchases, the coefﬁcients are negative. This means
that very large purchases are not associated higher abnormal returns. This shows that
insiders tend to use small or medium transactions to trade upon information. But
it is in strong contrast with the literature, in particular Betzer and Theissen (2009)
and Fidrmuc et al. (2006), where they report (although not in regression framework)
that the CARs are higher for higher trade sizes. As for the Cluster dummy variable,
for purchases the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant either for purchases or for sales. This
means that insiders do not systematically cluster their trades when they trade upon
information.
Results concerning group dummies are shown in Table 2.9. The coefﬁcients of
these dummies is taken from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in each category of insider and
trade, i.e. Model (1). Note that the coefﬁcients designate the difference of a group
with respect of the overall mean. Similar to what is obtained in Table 2.4, we see that
purchases by top executives in small ﬁrms are followed by strong positive abnormal
returns. In contrast, sales by top executives in small ﬁrms do not impact subsequent
share price. This is in line with the hypothesis that purchases are more informed than
sales.
In contrast to top executives, other insiders have no impact on abnormal returns
when they buy shares, but they do have an impact when they sell in small and
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shares in front of bad news because they fear less the regulator’s scrutiny than top
executives.
The effect of book-to-market ratio is also similar in the regression framework com-
pared to the results in Table 2.5. Top executives that buy stocks in value ﬁrms obtain
positive and signiﬁcant abnormal returns. This is consistent with insiders indicating
that the market is undervaluing the company. Similar results are obtained for other
insiders. Buying value stocks is followed by large positive abnormal returns. In addi-
tion, when other insiders sell growth stocks, there is a sharp decrease in subsequent
returns. This is consistent with information that the market is overvaluing the stock.
For top executives, we have a more precise information about the position of the
insider in the ﬁrm. The last group dummies distinguish between “Board of directors”
and “Supervisory board”. We see that the abnormal returns following trades do not
differ between these two categories of top executives.
The effect of ownership is shown on the bottom of Table 2.9. Ownership data is
taken from Thomson One. A ﬁrm falls in the category “Financial” if the largest share-
holder holds more than 5% of shares and is a ﬁnancial company (investment fund,
pension fund, bank, broker, etc.) The category “Holding + Corp. + Indiv.” means that
the largest shareholder has more than 5% of shares and is either a holding company,
a corporation (non ﬁnancial), or a private individual. Similarly for “Government”.
If no single shareholder owns more than 5% of shares, the ﬁrm falls in the category
“Widely held”. We see from the results that ownership does not lead to signiﬁcant
effects on the information content of trades. For top executives, if anything, insider
salesinwidelyheldﬁrmsarefollowedbylowerabnormalreturns, meaningthatthese
sells are more informed. But the size of the coefﬁcient is small. For other insiders, the
coefﬁcient of “Government” is large and signiﬁcant, but this is due to a very small
number of such trades in our sample (as seen by the proportion of observations in
this category). As a consequence, this result cannot be generalized.17
The right hand side of Table 2.8 shows regression results for exercise of options.
Since the majority of these trades are actually liquidation (exercise and sale of the
shares), we do not show different regression results for option conversion. Rather, we
control for those insiders who convert instead of liquidating by a dummy variable.
Coefﬁcients of these dummies (not shown in tables) are that insiders who sell shares
at the same time as liquidating their options account for 7% of the sample, and the
abnormal return for this group is on average 3.9% lower (signiﬁcant at the 5% level)
than those who just liquidate their options. In contrast, those who keep part or the
total number of shares obtained by the option account for 13.5% of the sample, and
they do not obtain statistically different abnormal returns than the average option
exercise.
For other insiders, the proportion of option exercises that arefull liquidation of
17As a robustness check, we used the Herﬁndahl index of ownership concentration instead of these
groups, and no signiﬁcant results came out of this speciﬁcation.CHAPTER 2 35
the shares obtained is even higher: 91%. And no statistically signiﬁcant difference
is measured between those who sell more than the option, those who liquidate the
shares, and those who keep some shares.
Table 2.8 shows as well that for top executives option exercises, the variable ILLIQ
is negative and signiﬁcant. This means that when the market liquidity is low, liqui-
dating options is associated with larger negative abnormal returns. This is consistent
with information.
2.5.4 Regulatory implications
The regression framework allows us to study the effect of two regulatory aspects.
First, the effect of late reporting can be observed by the coefﬁcients of the fourth
dummy group. As Table 2.9 shows, a relatively large proportion of top executives
report their trades later than the allowed period stipulated by the regulation (see
column 3 and column 6). The effect of late notiﬁcation for purchases is small and
insigniﬁcant. But the effect is quite important for sales: 39% of stock sales by top ex-
ecutives are reported late (after winsorizing out the trades that were reported more
than 3 months late, which we assume is a mistake in the data), and these stocks have
in average 1.78% negative abnormal returns (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). That is, even
after controlling for other factors, sales that are reported late to the regulator carry
more information than sales that are reported on time.
The analysis also allows us to study the regulation changes concerning insider
trading, through the years. The ﬁfth dummy group are time dummies that corre-
spond to different regulatory regimes. The different regimes are described in Section
2.3, above. Still from Table 2.9, we see that for top executives purchases, no signif-
icant difference can be observed concerning the information content the the trades.
For top executive sales, the abnormal returns were in average 1.11% lower in the
period prior to the Market Abuse Decree. This means that there is nowadays less in-
formation content in the sales of Top executives. The dummy variable for the period
immediately after the implementation of the Market Abuse Decree shows no statis-
tical signiﬁcance. But the period after November 2006 until the end of the sample
shows a positive coefﬁcient and is signiﬁcant. This result shows that it took one year
(from October 2005 to November 2006) before the effect of the new regulation could
be seen on the average CAR following sales of top executives.
Very similar results are obtained for other insiders. There is no difference in ab-
normal returns following purchases between the periods. For sales, the ﬁrst period
dummy, i.e. prior to September 2002, has a negative coefﬁcient of -0.94%. Note that
this period is where Top executives and Other insiders where not differentiated in the
dataset. The results show again that in the recent period, sales have less information
content than in earlier periods.36 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
2.6 Conclusion
Corporate insiders are often allowed to trade in their own company’s stock. Legal
insider trading however is in many countries subject to regulation. This paper ex-
amines the information content of legal insider trading in the Netherlands. We also
investigate how regulatory changes impact this information content. We proxy the in-
formation content by thecumulative abnormal returns around dates at whichinsiders
trade. We obtain a set of interesting results.
First, we ﬁnd important differences in information content both between pur-
chases and sales as well as between category of insiders (top executives and other
insiders). For example, the unconditional average abnormal return after purchases
by insiders is large and signiﬁcant: up to 2% in a window of one month and a half.
The information content is lower in magnitude and less signiﬁcant for sales. When
separating between category of insiders, the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal
return is larger for top executives whereas it is not statistically signiﬁcantly different
from zero for other insiders. This is consistent with top executives being much better
informed than other insiders. However, other insiders seem to have a good timing
ability: they buy when the stock is at a relative low and sell when it is at a relative
high.
Second, important differences in information content of insiders’ trades exist be-
tween small and large ﬁrms and between ﬁrms within different book-to-market ter-
ciles. Separating the sample in size terciles, the abnormal returns after purchases by
top executives are much larger for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that small ﬁrms are more opaque and less followed by the press
and by analysts, so that legal insider trading confers more information to the market
(or in other words, there is more information asymmetry in these stocks.) Breaking
down the sample into book-to-market terciles, we ﬁnd that purchases by top execu-
tives are more informative for value ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that have low stock price com-
pared to their accounting value. This suggests that when top executives buy shares
in these value stocks, it is perceived as a sign that the company’s prospects are good.
Third, we employ a regression framework in order to sort out the possible con-
founding factors, and to control for more variables that explain the variation in ab-
normal returns. We show that large holdings prior to purchases by top executives are
associated with greater abnormal returns: insiders that have large holdings are more
informed. A larger relative trading volume however is not associated with informa-
tion asymmetry: the larger the purchase, the lower the abnormal returns. We also ﬁnd
that market conditions are important determinants of the magnitude of the abnormal
returns. For purchases by top executives, a market with low liquidity is associated
with higher abnormal returns. This is consistent with information asymmetry. For
insider sales, market liquidity has the opposite effect: a lower market liquidity is as-
sociated with less information asymmetry. It is as if insiders make less informed salesCHAPTER 2 37
when the market is less liquid. This is consistent with diversiﬁcation motives.
Fourth, new to this literature is the comparison of the exercise of employee stock
options to purchases and sales of shares. We observe that a very small proportion of
insiders convert their options to stocks. Most of the time, they liquidate the shares
obtained, and the abnormal returns are on average negative after the execution of the
options.
Finally, we study the impact of regulatory changes on legal insider trading in the
Netherlands, especially the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Di-
rective of the European Union. We show that this new legislation had a signiﬁcant
effect on sales by top executives. The sales following the implementation of the Mar-
ket Abuse Directive were less information driven. Another policy implication of this
study is the fact that many insiders report their trades after the legal notiﬁcation pe-
riod allowed by law. We show that sales that are notiﬁed late are followed with neg-
ative abnormal returns. These sales have thus more information content and should
be monitored more closely.
Overall, the results show that some trades by insiders are information driven, and
the public registry of insider trading can be used by outsiders to evaluate the fun-
damental value of the stocks. This is consistent with legal insider trading being a
channel through which information circulates from the ﬁrm to the investors.
2.A Event study methodology
The event study methodology used in this paper is exposed here. For each company-
day observation, we run the following regression:
rit = ai + birmt + #it ,
where rit is the return of ﬁrm i at time t, rmt is the return of the AEX index at time t, ai
and bi are the parameters for ﬁrm i, and #it is an error term. The normal rate of return
is the expectation of the company’s return conditional of the contemporary market




 rmt, ˆ ai, ˆ bi

= ˆ ai + ˆ birmt .
The abnormal return, or AR, for a given ﬁrm at a given date is the difference between
the realized return and the normal return:
ARit = rit  
 
ˆ ai + ˆ birmt

.
The cumulative abnormal return, or CAR, for a given ﬁrm is the sum of the daily
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We then aggregate the abnormal returns of all company-days in the sample by aver-








The main hypothesis to test is whether the average cumulative abnormal return,
or CAR, is different to zero. The test statistic is the following (the J2 statistic in the















Under the assumptions of independence of the abnormal returns between events, this
test statistic is approximately distributed as standard normal.
2.B Cross-sectional regression methodology
Here is the regression equation (in matrix notation):




Xddd +Yg + e .
There are a total of N observations, with k+1 regressors (including the constant). The
notation is the following:
g0 is the intercept (a scalar),
i is a N-vector of ones,
D (a scalar) is the number of category sets (size categories, book-to-market cate-
gories, notiﬁcation delay categories, industry categories, etc.),
Xd is a N  length(dd) matrix of dummies that associate each observation to the
right category,
dd is the vector of the coefﬁcients of each category,
Y is a N  length(g) matrix of other regressors,
g is a vector of coefﬁcients, and
e is the vector of OLS residuals.
In order to identify the coefﬁcients, we use the following restrictions:
w0
ddd = 0 , d = 1,...,D ,CHAPTER 2 39
where wd is a set of weights. In words, the weighted sum of the coefﬁcients of the
dummies, for each set, must be equal to 0. By imposing this restriction, we can iden-
tify the intercept, and the effect of each dummy in a category set. For example, in the
size category set, if the coefﬁcient for small capitalization ﬁrms is positive, it means
that this category has relatively more impact than the average ﬁrm, in addition to the
value of the intercept.
The weights are set in order to balance the fact that some categories have more ob-
servations than others. For example, in the industry dummy set, the industry “Health
care” have less observations than other industries. Using this weighting scheme gives
more intuitive results, as the sum of the coefﬁcients in a given category set is always
zero, even if the number of observations is not equal in each category. This is obtained
simply by setting the weight to be the number of observations in a given category di-
vided by the total number of observations.
2.C Computationofthestandard-deviationsinthecross-sectional
regression
We need a robust method for the standard-deviation for the cross-sectional regres-
sion because we use observations that are de-aggregated, i.e. insider-day events. The
variance-covariance matrix used to robust to heteroskedasticity between observa-
tions, as well as robust to clustering. By clustering, we mean two or more insiders
from the same company that trade during the same day. In this case, the CAR of the
stock is not independent between these observations; on the contrary the CAR will be
identical for these observations. Ignoring this fact would bias upward the test statis-
tic, thus over-rejecting a null hypothesis.











where ˆ S is the robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms.
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where the index represents the company-day events. If many insiders from the same
company trade during the same day, the element ˆ Si is not a scalar, but a square matrix
of size equal to the number of observations for this company-day. In this case, this40 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING IN THE NETHERLANDS
square matrix is equal to:
ˆ Si =





where J is the number of insiders of the ith company trading during this day, and
where 1J is a square matrix of ones of size J, and ˆ ei is the OLS residual.
An example will illustrate best how the matrix ˆ S is constructed. Assume there are
four observations for the cross-sectional regression, i.e. four CARs. Assume two of
them are trades by insiders from the same company that traded during the same day.
We have CARij for company i = 1 to 3. Company i = 2 has two insiders and so we
have j = 1 to 2 for that company. We estimate the coefﬁcients by OLS, and we obtain
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0 ˆ S2 0































LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY1
Abstract
Thischapterassessestheimpactoflegaltradesbycorporateinsidersonthestockmar-
ket liquidity and studies the effect of a change in insider trading regulation, namely
the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/
6/EC) on the Dutch stock market. In doing so, we analyze two liquidity measures
and one information asymmetry measure. We ﬁnd that on average, the intensity of
legal insider trading is positively related to the bid-ask spread and to information
asymmetry. We ﬁnd also that the Market Abuse Directive did not reduce signiﬁcantly
this effect. Analyzing liquidity and information asymmetry on a day-by-day basis,
we ﬁnd that small and large capitalization stocks see their bid-ask spread and the
permanent price impact increase when insiders trade. For mid-cap stocks, only the
permanent price impact increases. We show that the new legislation did not signiﬁ-
cantly reduce this effect.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study stock market liquidity around dates of legal insider trading
in the Netherlands. Trades by corporate insiders are highly regulated, especially since
the European Union directive called “Market Abuse Directive” (European Union Di-
rective 2003/6/EC) was incorporated into the Dutch national regulation. Even then,
insiders are known to have better information than outside investors about the future
prospects of their ﬁrm (see e.g. Degryse et al., 2009). In this context, we investigate
1This chapter is co-authored by professors Hans Degryse and Frank de Jong. The authors thank the
discussant and the seminar participants at the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM),
and at the Louvain School of Management.
4142 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
whether legal trades by insiders in shares of their own company have an impact on
the stock’s liquidity.
The Market Abuse Directive aims at tightening and at expanding stock market
regulation regarding market abuse and manipulation, and in particular insider trad-
ing. Its goal is also to harmonize the legislation in countries of the European Union.
Incorporated into Dutch regulation on October 1st, 2005, the two aspects of this new
regulation important for our study are, ﬁrst, the strengthening of monitoring and
punishment of illegal insider trading. Therefore, corporate insiders are less likely to
trade upon inside information. Second, the new regulation obliges listed companies
to disclose through press releases any information that is relevant for the valuation of
the stock. As such, if companies disclose more information, then corporate insiders
have less information advantage over outside investors. These two effects together
should decrease the information asymmetry of corporate insiders’ trades.
Very few papers have studied quantitatively the impact of the Market Abuse Di-
rective.2 This chapter makes a contribution on this subject by analyzing whether the
effect of insider trading on the stock’s liquidity changed after the implementation of
this European Union wide regulation. We tackle this topic by studying data from the
Netherlands. The research questions analyzed in this chapter are the following. How
do legal insider trades affect stock market liquidity? Do the bid-ask spread and price
impact increase? Does the implementation of the European Union Market Abuse Di-
rective reduce the effect of insider trading on the liquidity of the stocks?
Two approaches are used to analyze these research questions. A ﬁrst approach
looks at the effect of the intensity, or the prevalence, of insider trading on the average
stock liquidity and permanent price impact. This is a cross-sectional approach. The
second approach proceeds by looking more closely at the short-term effect around
dates of legal insider trading. More speciﬁcally, we calculate the impact on a stock’s
illiquidity induced by the presence of corporate insiders on the market, by subtracting
illiquidity measures on the date of the trading by the same measure obtained during
a benchmark period. We label this as “abnormal illiquidity”. This is repeated for each
insider trading event and for each ﬁrm. This abnormal illiquidity is then analyzed
in a regression framework. The goal is to assess whether the presence of informed
traders creates abnormal illiquidity, be it by enlarging the bid-ask spread or the ad-
verse selection component of the spread (as measured by the permanent price impact
of trades).
Our ﬁndings are that insider trading is important to explain liquidity both on the
cross-section and around event dates. On the cross-section, stocks with more insider
trading have wider spreads and a larger permanent price impact. Also, we show
that the Market Abuse Directive helped to reduce this effect. On a smaller scale, we
2To our knowledge, only two papers analyze the effect of the Market Abuse Directive: AFM (2007)
study the abnormal returns and trading volume around press releases and news announcements; and
Degryse et al. (2009), where the authors study the information content of trades by corporate insiders.CHAPTER 3 43
found that on days of insider trading, the spreads and price impact are larger than on
other days (this is true mostly for small and large companies, but it is less the case for
medium-sized stocks). This small-scale analysis did not allow us to identify a positive
effect of the Market Abuse Directive.
This chapter brings together three strands of literature, the ﬁrst of which is about
legal insider trading. Several papers show that legal insider trading helps to predict
future stock price performance (see e.g. Degryse et al., 2009, Fidrmuc et al., 2006, Jeng
et al., 2003, Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Seyhun, 1998). This is consistent with trades
by corporate insiders being perceived by other stock market participants as based
partly on private information. The current chapter extends this literature by ana-
lyzing whether a stock’s liquidity measures on dates of insider trading are different
compared to non insider trading days.
The second strand of literature related to our study includes papers that analyze
market liquidity around information events. For example, Lee et al. (1993), Krinsky
and Lee (1996) and Kavajecz (1999) study the bid-ask spread and adverse selection
costs around earnings announcements. Aktas et al. (2007) study the probability of in-
formed trading (PIN) around merger and acquisition announcements. This literature,
like the present chapter, aims at testing empirical implications of theoretical market
microstructure models of adverse selection (see e.g. Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom
(1985); O’Hara (1995) or de Jong and Rindi (2009) provide a review of these models).
This chapter also relates to the literature about ﬁnancial market regulation, and
speciﬁcally about insider trading regulation. It thus contributes to the debate about
the efﬁciency of insider trading regulations (see e.g. Bainbridge, 2000, Bhattacharya
and Daouk, 2002). For this purpose, we also analyze the effect of a change in reg-
ulation concerning insider trading on the Dutch stock market. A similar analysis
of a change in insider trading regulation is done by Frijns et al. (2008) for the New
Zealand Stock Exchange. The authors study whether the average adverse selection
component of the spreads of all stocks on the exchange changed when new regula-
tions about insider trading were adopted in New Zealand. They ﬁnd a reduction of
adverse selection after the implementation of the regulation. While their paper only
investigates liquidity measures around the change in regulation, the present chapter
goes one step further by also looking speciﬁcally on dates where insiders traded.
The literature studying legal insider trading and effects on market liquidity is
scarce. The existing papers use a cross-sectional approach to compare the impact
of insider trading on spreads across ﬁrms. Chung and Charoenwong (1998) study
the bid-ask spread of U.S. stocks and relate it to legal insider trading. They ﬁnd that
in average, ﬁrms with larger extent of legal insider trading have larger spreads, but
contrary to our results, they do not ﬁnd evidence that spreads increase in the period
around legal insider trading. Khan et al. (2005) study the impact of insider trading
on market liquidity in the NASDAQ market. They obtain mixed results and provide
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ket. We improve upon these studies by analyzing more sophisticated measures of
the spread including the adverse selection component. In addition, we extend the
results for a different market structure, which is, in our case, a fully automated limit
order book market. Also related to this strand of literature, Aktas et al. (2008) study
the contribution to price discovery that is due to legal insider trading. Garﬁnkel and
Nimalendran (2003) and Gleason (2007) study the difference in response to insider
trading by market makers between NASDAQ and NYSE.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the data and
the methodology, and provides descriptive statistics about different liquidity mea-
sures. Section 3.3 presents results of a cross-sectional analysis of the effect of intensity
of legal insider trading on the average liquidity of stocks. Section 3.4 presents a day-
by-day analysis of the effect of legal insider trading on the stock’s liquidity. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and methodology
Our data on legal insider trading is obtained from the AFM (Authority for the Finan-
cial Markets, the Dutch ﬁnancial markets supervisor). The dataset consists of the days
for which a corporate insider traded shares, for each stock. Unfortunately, the trade
time during the day is not included in the dataset, rendering it impossible to study
intraday changes in a stock’s liquidity. We use only trades in shares by Directors
and Board members (top executives). Trades related to option exercise are excluded.3
When many insiders from the same company trade during a given day, we aggregate
the order ﬂow, so that for each company-date pair we can determine whether it is an
insider purchase date or an insider sale date.
Prior to October 2005, the main article of law that regulated insider trading by di-
rectors and board members was the Act of the Disclosure of Major Holdings of 1996
(Wmz 1996). In 1999, an important change to this regulation was introduced: all cor-
porate insiders had to notify their trades in their own company’s stock to a public
registry. The reporting delay was set to 10 days after the end of the month in which
the trade occurred. In 2002, this reporting delay was reduced to one business day for
top executives, i.e. the insiders analyzed by this chapter. In October 2005, the Mar-
ket Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) was implemented into
the Dutch law. This new regulation increased substantially the punishment to ille-
gal insider trading and made it mandatory for listed ﬁrms to disclose price-sensitive
information through press releases. One of the concerns that led to this regulation
was that insiders were incited to trade in advance of important company news an-
nouncements (AFM, 2007). Raising the penalty to this behavior and requiring every
3For example, insiders often sell shares immediately after having acquired them through a stock
option scheme. Such sales are not taken into account in the present analysis. Degryse et al. (2009) and
Cziraki et al. (2010) analyze option exercise by corporate insiders in the Netherlands.CHAPTER 3 45
company to publish news announcements on a timely manner aimed at reducing in-
formation leakage and, therefore, increasing market cleanliness. According to AFM
(2007), the new regulation reduced information leakage prior to press releases mainly
for small ﬁrms, as well as technological ﬁrms. These ﬁrms have typically lower gov-
ernance structures and thus are more prone to suspicious insider trading. In contrast,
large ﬁrms often have very stringent rules about their executives’ trades (e.g. exec-
utives are allowed to trade only during a certain window after quarterly earnings
announcements). Therefore, we hypothesize that small ﬁrms will have a larger ef-
fect of insider trading on their stock’s liquidity and price impact. Also, we expect to
ﬁnd a stronger effect of the new regulation for these ﬁrms. We refer to Degryse et al.
(2009) for more detail about the dataset and the institutional and regulatory details
concerning insider trading in the Netherlands.
In order to compute liquidity measures and the price impact, we use high fre-
quency data from Euronext Amsterdam. The database contains all executed trades
and best quotes, and covers the period from July 2004 to December 2007. We use also
Datastream to obtain the market capitalization of stocks in the sample.
3.2.1 Methodology
Two measures of liquidity and one measure of adverse selection are computed on a
daily basis. The ﬁrst measure is the quoted spread. It is deﬁned as the relative spread










where the T quotes that appear during the trading day are used, and where At and Bt
are the best ask price and the best bid price, respectively. mt is the mid-quote deﬁned
as (At + Bt)/2. The second measure, the effective spread, is twice the relative spread















Here, the spread is computed for the T trades that occur during the trading day. The
measure of adverse selection is the permanent price impact4 deﬁned as twice the rel-












4The use of the permanent price impact as a measure of informational content of trades is due to
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where qt is the direction of the trade, +1 for a purchase and  1 for a sale. We use sev-
eral time frames to determine the future quote mid-point (i.e. the value of n), ranging
from 1 minute to 1 hour (see Section 3.2.2). To compute all three measures, we discard
opening and closing auctions, as well as cross-trades. Figure 3.1 helps to understand
the meaning of these measures by showing an example of a purchase.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the spread measures
Thisﬁgureillustratestheliquiditymeasures. A isthebestaskquote, B isthebestbidquote, m isthemid-
quote and T is the price at which the trade executes. The effective spread is the difference between the
transaction price and the quote mid-point. The trade occurs at time t. At time t + n the realized spread
(the difference between the transaction price and the future quote mid-point) and the price impact (the
difference between the quote mid-point at the time of the trade and the future quote mid-point) are












In order to perform a cross-sectional analysis, we use two different proxies for the
intensity, or prevalence, of legal insider trading. The ﬁrst intensity measure, INT1, is
the total number of shares traded by insiders for a given company, scaled by the num-
ber of shares outstanding. The second intensity proxy, INT2, is the number of insider
trading days over the total number of trading days; in other words, the proportion of
trading days with legal insider trading. We hypothesize that the more days with in-
sider trading, the more information asymmetry there is between market participants
and insiders, and thus the less liquid the stock will be.
To analyze the behavior of the spread around dates of insider trading, we use a
methodology that closely resembles the event study methodology. “Abnormal Illiq-
uidity”, or AI for short is a daily measure of change in liquidity compared to a bench-CHAPTER 3 47
mark liquidity.5 The idea is to subtract a given measure of illiquidity of a stock on
a day by the expected illiquidity, or benchmark illiquidity. The illiquidity measures
used are the quoted bid-ask spread, the effective bid-ask spread, and the permanent
price impact.6
More formally, Abnormal Illiquidity for stock i on event date t is measured as
follows:
AIit = Illiquidityit   Benchmarkit,
where the Benchmark illiquidity is computed by averaging the measure of illiquidity
on days -10 until +10 around the insider trading day, excluding days 0 to 4 (i.e. ﬁve
trading days starting on the date of insider trading). The Abnormal Illiquidity can
thus be obtained for ﬁve days: the date of insider trading itself, and the following
four trading days. The rationale for using a window of ﬁve days to measure Ab-
normal Illiquidity is because it might be possible that market participants detect the
presence of insiders with a delay, and they might adjust the bid-ask spread with some
lag. This isa similarapproach to otherpapers inthe literaturethat performshort-term
event studies on market microstructure effects. Researchers typically use shorter es-
timation and event windows compared to the traditional event study methodology.
Chung and Charoenwong (1998) use as event period a window of ﬁve days before
and after the event date, and as benchmark period 15 days before and after the es-
timation period. Garﬁnkel and Nimalendran (2003) also perform a short-term event
study with microstructure measures. They compare liquidity measures on insider
trading dates, i.e. a one-day event window, with a benchmark of ﬁve trading days.
Moreover, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) ﬁnd that there is a change in the bid-ask
spread on date of insider trading and also to some extent on some following days.
But no change is detected in liquidity and market conditions before the insider trad-
ing date. For these reasons, it is reasonable to take an event window of ﬁve days
starting on the insider trading date, and an estimation window of 15 days around the
event window.
The Abnormal Illiquidity measures from day 0 to day 4, for a given stock, are
then added up to obtain what we call Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (CAI). This
measure is to be interpreted simply as the sum of the above average illiquidity of the
stock over ﬁve days.
The methodology used allows to test whether the CAI’s are statistically different
from zero and closely follows the event study methodology. The CAI’s for all the
stocks and events of insider trading are then averaged. We thus obtain the average
CAI due to the presence of insiders on the market. To test whether the average CAI
is different from zero, we ﬁrst standardize each CAI by its estimation error, then we
5The concept of Abnormal Illiquidity measure is analogous to Abnormal Returns, used in event
studies.
6When the bid-ask spread increases, the stock is less liquid. This is why we call it a measure of
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aggregate these standardized CAI’s to obtain a statistic that has a known distribution,




Each individual standardized CAI is distributed as a Student t distribution with m  
1 degrees of freedom, where m is the number of observations used to compute the
benchmark illiquidity (in our case, m = 16). The variance of this distribution is m 1
m 3.























m 1 SCAI  N(0,1).
The z statistic is used to make inferences about the average cumulative abnormal
illiquidity.
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics about insider trades and the companies in the
sample. To get an idea of how these statistics change with company size, we sepa-
rate into market capitalization terciles. Also, for some statistics, we show how they
changed before and after the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).
This table shows descriptive statistics about the companies in the sample, trades by insiders, and normal
trades that execute on the Euronext stock market. Panel A shows market capitalization, obtained by
multiplying the price per share by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of each
calendar year. Panel B shows the mean and median size of trades by insiders, for the period before the
implementation of Market Abuse Directive (MAD), after its implementation as well as for the whole
period. Panel C shows the insider trade sizes in euros. Panels D and E show the mean and standard
deviation of the intensity measures: INT1 is computed as the total shares traded by insiders scaled by
the number of shares outstanding in thousands. INT2 is the percentage of trading days with insider
trading. Panels F and G show statistics about the trades executed on the Euronext platform: number of
stock-days observations, the mean number of trades per day and the mean trade size in euros.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Small Medium Large All
PANEL A – Average number of trades per year
Insider trades 7.2 6.3 15.3 10.1
Non insider trades 19,468 65,269 343,477 162,923
Percentage of insider trades 0.037% 0.010% 0.004% 0.006%CHAPTER 3 49
PANEL B – Insider trade size scaled by shares outstanding (x1000)
All periods Mean 10.11 2.89 0.44 3.96
Median 0.303 0.274 0.020 0.114
Before MAD Mean 7.91 5.21 0.80 4.02
Median 0.244 0.289 0.012 0.083
After MAD Mean 10.91 0.75 0.23 3.92
Median 0.335 0.248 0.025 0.125
PANEL C – Insider trade value (thousand euros)
All periods Mean 818.5 835.4 694.3 774.5
Median 51.9 111.6 78.8 82.8
Before MAD Mean 557.7 1036.5 276.3 641.6
Median 8.9 98.4 59.8 60.8
After MAD Mean 913.7 650.2 941.7 854.7
Median 74.7 169.8 94.8 99.1
PANEL D – INT1
All periods Mean 57.8 11.4 14.8 27.9
Sd 131.4 39.9 48.0 85.8
Before MAD Mean 34.0 11.8 16.5 21.8
Sd 52.6 43.9 59.4 52.6
After MAD Mean 85.1 11.1 13.4 33.2
Sd 182.7 37.7 37.8 106.6
PANEL E – INT2
All periods Mean 1.53% 1.20% 1.82% 1.52%
Sd 2.32% 1.19% 2.96% 2.27%
Before MAD Mean 1.86% 1.08% 1.49% 1.51%
Sd 2.95% 1.09% 1.64% 2.12%
After MAD Mean 1.15% 1.29% 2.08% 1.52%
Sd 1.24% 1.27% 3.71% 2.41%
PANEL F – Average daily number of trades
Number of stock-days Non insider trading days 1,981 2,113 2,380 6,474
Insider trading days 259 306 386 951
Mean number of trades Non insider trading days 75 258 1,698 731
Insider trading days 76 273 1,441 694
Mean trade size (euros) Non insider trading days 1,008 1,603 2,497 1,750
Insider trading days 1,346 1,515 2,425 1,838
PANEL G – Market capitalization (million euros)
Market capitalization 139 620 15,400 6,358
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the incidence of insider trading. We see that companies
have from 7.2 to 15.3 insider trades per year, depending on their size, with an overall
averageofabout10insidertradesperﬁrmperyear. Thesenumbersareofcomparable
magnitude to the sample used by Chung and Charoenwong (1998), which represents
the US market during the year 1988 (they have an average of 10 insider trades per
ﬁrm per year). However, in our sample, insider trades represent a lower proportion
of all trades compared to Chung and Charoenwong’s sample (0.006% in our sample
compared to 0.07% in theirs). Panels B and C show the size of trades by insiders as
proportion of shares outstanding (Panel B) and in value (Panel C). In every case, the50 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
mean is much larger than the median, indicating a large skewness. Insider trade sizes
as a proportion of shares outstanding are smaller for larger companies. In terms of
value traded, there is no clear pattern with respect to ﬁrm size. Panels D and E show
the mean and standard deviation of the intensity measures INT1 and INT2. Both
variables are fairly stable between periods (before and after MAD). Panels F shows
the number and size of intraday trades, during days without insider tradingas well as
days with insider trading. We see that the mean trade size is increasing with market
capitalization. We see also that the mean number of trades per day as well as the
mean trade size in euro is not largely different on days of insider trading compared
to days without insider trading.
We now determine which intraday time frame is suitable is order to compute the
permanent price impact (the index n in equation 3.1). In order to do so, it is useful to
show a graph of the price impact as a function of intraday time. See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Price impact
This graph shows the mean price impact of trades, for each market capitalization tercile. The price
impact is scaled by the quote mid-point. Time is in seconds. The data used are all days with insider
trading plus 10 days prior and after the trades.






























Using all company-date couples in the sample (insider trading days as well as 10
days prior and after the trading day itself), Figure 3.2 shows the realized spread using
several time frames: 1 minute, 2 minutes, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, and all multiples of 5CHAPTER 3 51
minutes until 1 hour. All trades are used (insider trading dates as well as non insider
trading dates). The data are separated into three categories of stocks sorted by market
capitalization. The graph shows that it takes some time for the information content
of a trade to be incorporated into the quotes. We see also that a different time frame
should be used for each size category. For large ﬁrms, after 10 minutes the price
impact curve is practically ﬂat. This means that after 10 minutes, the information
content of the trade is almost entirely impacted in the quotes. For medium ﬁrms,
a 30-minute time frame seems to be reasonable. For small ﬁrms, the price impact
increases until at least one hour after the trade. For this reason, we use 10, 30 and
60 minute time frame for large, medium and small ﬁrms, respectively, in order to
compute the permanent price impact of each trade.
Table 3.2 shows some descriptive statistics about the spread measures. Consistent
with the literature on market liquidity, the quoted spread and effective spread both
are decreasing functions of market capitalization. The (permanent) price impact can
be seen as the proﬁts to informed traders. We see that the price impact is larger for
small ﬁrms. This is consistent with the view that small ﬁrms suffer more from ad-
verse selection costs than large ﬁrms, since they are typically more opaque, and less
followed by the press and by analysts.
In the next section, we analyze how the intensity of insider trading affects the
average liquidity and price impact of stocks on the cross-sectional level.
3.3 Intensity of legal insider trading
This section answers the question whether, in the cross-section, liquidity providers
on the market adjust the spreads depending on the intensity of insider trading. Since
insiders are investors that have informational advantages over other market partic-
ipants, we hypothesize that liquidity measures will be different depending on the
intensity of insider trading, i.e. depending on the likelihood of trading against an in-
sider. As in Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we regress the average stock liquidity
on the known explanatory variables, and on the intensity of insider trading. Also, we
test for the effect of the change in regulation regime, namely the implementation of
the Market Abuse Directive, similarly to Frijns et al. (2008).
The methodology used closely resembles the traditional methodology for analyz-
ing the determinants of the bid-ask spread (see Stoll (2000), and Demsetz (1968) for an
early treatment of this idea). But using a simple cross-sectional regression with one
observation per stock, we would not be able to identify the effect due to the Market
Abuse Directive. Instead of using one observation per stock, we use one observation
per stock-period (pre- and post-MAD). This allows us to use a dummy variable to
control for the effect of the new regulation.7 Thus, the basis of observation is a stock-
7Note that some companies in the dataset do not appear in both periods. Indeed, some stocks are52 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the liquidity measures
This table shows descriptive statistics about the liquidity measures. The quoted spread, the effective
spread, and the price impact are in relative terms (i.e. percentage of price). The price impact is computed
with an horizon of 10 minutes for large ﬁrms, 30 minutes for medium ﬁrms, and 60 minutes for small
ﬁrms. See Section 3.2. The table shows for each market capitalization tercile the mean of the liquidity
measures, for days of insider trading as well as days without insider trading. The sample is further
separated in the period pre- and post-Market Abuse Directive.
Small Medium Large All
PANEL A – Quoted Spread
Before MAD Non ins. tr. days 1.434 0.680 0.398 0.744
Ins. tr. days 1.711 0.643 0.581 0.845
All days 1.454 0.677 0.412 0.752
After MAD Non ins. tr. days 0.844 0.372 0.140 0.460
Ins. tr. days 0.891 0.369 0.518 0.602
All days 0.848 0.371 0.179 0.473
PANEL B – Effective Spread
Before MAD Non ins. tr. days 1.334 0.605 0.370 0.681
Ins. tr. days 1.569 0.562 0.545 0.768
All days 1.351 0.602 0.384 0.688
After MAD Non ins. tr. days 0.697 0.300 0.118 0.379
Ins. tr. days 0.750 0.299 0.474 0.519
All days 0.701 0.300 0.155 0.392
PANEL C – Price Impact
Before MAD Nns. tr. days 0.215 0.178 0.097 0.155
Ins. tr. days 0.343 0.215 0.149 0.217
All days 0.225 0.181 0.101 0.160
After MAD Non ins. tr. days 0.219 0.152 0.062 0.144
Ins. tr. days 0.296 0.188 0.103 0.190
All days 0.225 0.155 0.066 0.148CHAPTER 3 53
period, where each variable is an average over the period. The effect of intensity
of insider trading on liquidity and price impact is obtained by adding the intensity
measure in the regression. Also, we add a dummy for MAD, to capture the effect
of the regulatory regime. Finally, we add an interaction variable between MAD and
intensity. The regression equation is the following:
Liqi = b0 + b1logMCapi + b2InvPricei + b3logVoli + b4Voltyi + b5INTk
i
+ b6MADi + b7MAD  INTk
i + #i, (3.2)
where: Liqi is the average of the liquidity measure under study (quoted spread, effec-
tive spread and price impact, in percentage points); logMCapi is the log of the market
capitalization of stock-period i; InvPricei is the inverse of the average price, using
daily closing prices for stock-period i; logVoli is the average daily trading volume;
INTk
i , k = 1,2, is the intensity of insider trades, either total shares traded, scaled by
the number of shares outstanding in thousands (k = 1), or proportion of days with
insider trading (k = 2). We add an interaction variable of the regulatory regime and
insider trading intensity, MAD  INTk
i , that will capture any difference in the ef-
fect of insider trading intensity on the spread before and after the implementation of
the Market Abuse Directive. We use standard errors consistent for heteroskedasticity
and clustering, since most companies enter the regression twice and therefore their
liquidity measures might not be independent for each observation. The results of the
regression are shown in Table 3.3.
The results show that the intensity of insider trading has an effect on the average
stock liquidity, after controlling for other factors. Both speciﬁcations (i.e. model (1)
with INT1 and model (2) with INT2) have positive coefﬁcients for intensity of in-
sider trading on the quoted spread, the effective spread, and permanent price impact.
The coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant for model (1). For model (2), intensity of
insider trading has a signiﬁcant effect only for the effective spread.8 Economic sig-
niﬁcance can be measured by multiplying the coefﬁcient by one standard-deviation
of the intensity variables. We see from the results that for a one standard-deviation
increase in INT1 (i.e. 85.8 from Table 3.1), the quoted spread increases by roughly
0.1% compared with an average quoted spread of 0.75% before MAD and 0.47% af-
ter MAD (from Table 3.2). This is an economically signiﬁcant effect. The magnitude
of this effect is similar to what is found in Chung and Charoenwong (1998) for the
US market. Our results for the effective spread are similar than for quoted spread.
For the permanent price impact, the results are weaker: an increase of one standard
deviation of INT1 increases PI by about 0.02%. But this has to be compared with an
average price impact of 0.15% to 0.16%, which makes it still economically signiﬁcant.
traded only before MAD, while others appear only after its implementation. This means that the sample
of companies is less than doubled using this methodology.
8Due to the clustering of the residuals, the degrees of freedom is 83, and so the cut-off points of the t
statistics are 1.66, 1.99 and 2.64 for the 10, 5 and 1% conﬁdence levels, respectively.54 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
Table 3.3: Intensity of insider trading and stock liquidity
This table shows the effect of the intensity of insider trading on average stock liquidity, namely quoted
spread and effective spread, and on permanent price impact. Two measures of intensity of insider
trading are used. The ﬁrst is the total number of shares traded by insiders for a given company, scaled
by the number of shares outstanding. The second intensity measure is the proportion of trading days
with insider trading. The explanatory variables are: log market capitalization (logMCap); the inverse
of the average stock price (InvPrice); the log of the average daily volume (logVol); the daily volatility
(Volty); insider trading intensity (INT1 and INT2); a dummy variable that equals 1 after the Market
Abuse Directive, and zero otherwise (MAD); an interaction term between MAD and insider trading
intensity (MADINT1 and MADINT2). All variables are computed using all dates for which the
companies are traded on Euronext Amsterdam, from July 2004 until end of December 2007. Robust t
statistics are shown in brackets.
QS ES PI
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 1.6680 1.7070 1.3599 1.3867 0.4090 0.4217
(2.48) (2.50) (2.07) (2.08) (3.92) (3.97)
logMCap -0.0660 -0.0671 -0.0630 -0.0650 -0.0222 -0.0238
(-1.43) (-1.51) (-1.37) (-1.47) (-1.90) (-2.37)
InvPrice 1.0251 1.0354 1.0336 1.0429 0.0693 0.0694
(10.71) (10.48) (10.86) (10.74) (2.31) (2.50)
logVol -0.0586 -0.0625 -0.0413 -0.0439 -0.0049 -0.0045
(-1.02) (-1.09) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.42) (-0.44)
Volty 0.6155 0.6128 0.5863 0.5847 0.0964 0.0963
(1.82) (1.82) (1.76) (1.77) (2.00) (2.00)
INT1 0.0011 – 0.0011 – 0.0002 –
(2.41) (2.40) (1.92)
INT2 – 3.0576 – 3.5196 – 0.6417
(1.53) (1.77) (0.86)
MAD 0.2093 0.2555 0.1952 0.2450 0.0323 0.0345
(1.29) (1.36) (1.22) (1.32) (1.33) (1.22)
MADINT1 -0.0005 – -0.0005 – -0.0001 –
(-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.88)
MADINT2 – -3.2653 – -3.4945 – -0.1771
(-1.28) (-1.40) (-0.30)
N 135 135 135 135 135 135
Adj. R2 0.7396 0.7385 0.7369 0.7364 0.6399 0.6394CHAPTER 3 55
Results for model (2) using INT2, the proportion of days with insider trading, are
of similar magnitude, although the regression results show that the statistical signif-
icance is lower. Overall, the regression results clearly show that a larger amount of
insider trading harms market liquidity and adverse selection.
Care has to be taken in the interpretation of the coefﬁcient for the Market Abuse
Directive dummy. This coefﬁcient might capture some differences between the two
periods that are not due to the regulation per se. For example, it is well known that
liquidity increases over time (this can be seen in the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2),
thus an negative coefﬁcient is to be expected even if the new regulation did not have
any effect on liquidity. But what is observed is a positive coefﬁcient, although not
signiﬁcant. This is surprising because the result of MAD is to increase the penalty
to illegal insider trading as well as obliging companies to publish more information
in the form of press releases. This should lower the information asymmetry between
insiders and outside investors, and thus reduce the price impact. We do not observe
this effect.
The interaction term between MAD and INTk aims at capturing whether the Mar-
ket Abuse Directive helped to reduce the impact of insider trading on stock liquidity.
All models have negative coefﬁcients. These negative coefﬁcients mean that the in-
tensity of insider trading is affecting less stock liquidity after the implementation of
the new regulation. However, the results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
TheresultsaresimilartoFrijnsetal.(2008)butintheirpaper, onlythepriceimpact,
or the information content of trades, seems to be reduced due to the new regulation.9
This section showed that the average liquidity of stocks is affected by the intensity
of insider trading. The next section will investigate whether insiders have an effect
on the stock liquidity on days of their trades.
3.4 Stock liquidity around dates of legal insider trading
In this section, we want to analyze whether insiders affect stock liquidity and price
impact on the exact day when they trade. Before to start with the analysis of Abnor-
mal Illiquidity, we show the price impact curve, similar to Figure 3.2, but this time
separating days when insiders trade (dashed lines) from days with no insider trading
(solid line). The graph can be seen in Figure 3.3. We see that the price impact is in
average larger on days of insider trading. This is especially pronounced for small cap
ﬁrms, where the average price impact on days without insider trading is about 0.36%,
while on insider trading days, the average price impact reaches 0.48%.
9The difference between our results and those of Frijns et al. (2008) may be due to methodology. They
use model-based methodologies for decomposing the bid-ask spread into its components (Glosten and
Harris, 1988, Madhavan and Cheng, 1997) while we use a model-free methodology.56 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
Figure 3.3: Price impact with and without insider trading
This ﬁgure shows the mean price impact, broken down into size terciles, on dates with insider trading
(dashed line) and dates without insider trading (solid lines). the price impact is scaled by the quote mid-
point. Time is in seconds. Days without insider trading are 10 days preceding and 10 days following
insider trading.
































Table 3.2 also shows how liquidity and adverse selection changes between days
of insider trading and days without insider trading. We can see that quoted spreads
(Panel A) and effective spreads (Panel B) are qualitatively larger on days of insider
trading compared to days without insider trading. Surprisingly, this is the case only
for small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms. It is not the case for medium ﬁrms. For the permanent
priceimpact(PanelC),thisadverseselectionmeasureislargeroninsidertradingdays
compared to non-insider trading days for all ﬁrms sizes.
To give an example of how much this change in liquidity affects trading costs, as-
sume an investor trades for A C10,000 of a large stock, after the Market Abuse Directive
has passed. The implicit trading cost, not accounting for commissions and fees, is
best represented by the effective spread. In our case, it would be 0.118%/2 (the trader
pays half the spread for a single trade), i.e. A C5.90. On days of insider trading, this cost
would jump to A C47.40/2 = A C23.70. This cost could be further decomposed into infor-
mation asymmetry costs and liquidity costs. The part due to information asymmetry
is 0.062%/2, i.e. A C3.10 on days without insider trading, and A C5.15 on days of insider
trading.CHAPTER 3 57
3.4.1 Abnormal Illiquidity
To analyze the change in liquidity and price impact due to insider trading, for each
company-date pair, we use the Abnormal Illiquidity measure, deﬁned in Section 3.2.1,
above. Figure 3.4 shows the Abnormal Illiquidiy and Cumulative Abnormal Illiquid-
ity for each liquidity measure (quoted spread, effective spread and price impact), and
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We see from Figure 3.4 that for small ﬁrms, all Abnormal Illiquidity measures are
different from zero at day zero, i.e. on the insider trading day, but not afterwards.
The Cumulative Abnormal Price Impact remains statistically different from zero on
day 1 and on day 4. This means that insiders induce an increase in illiquidity on the
date at which they trade. This increase is important as it is close to 5 basis points for
the quoted spread and the effective spread, and close to 10 basis points for the price
impact. These numbers can be compared with the average values for the liquidity
measure in the sample provided in Table 3.2, where we see that the average effective
spread is about 1.35% of the share price before MAD and 0.70% after MAD. So an
abnormal effective spread on insider trading day of 0.05% is an economically non-
negligible increase.
Medium ﬁrms show a different pattern than small ﬁrms on date of insider trading
for the Abnormal Quoted Spread and the Abnormal Effective spread. The average
AbnormalIlliquidityisnegativeforthesemeasures, butnotstatisticallydifferentfrom
zero. However, the Abnormal Price Impact is positive and signiﬁcant: an increase of
about 3 to 4 basis points (compared to an average before MAD of 0.19% and of 0.16%
after MAD).
Figure 3.4 shows as well that large ﬁrms are not systematically affected in their
liquidity on days of insider trading. The Abnormal Illiquidity is close to zero and
non signiﬁcant on day zero. However, there is a pattern of increasing Cumulative
Abnormal Illiquidity for this size category. For the effective spread and the price im-
pact, the CAI reaches a signiﬁcant 7 basis points on day 4. There is a similar increase
for the quoted spread, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. This means that for large
ﬁrms, the liquidity measures react with a delay to insider trading. This pattern can
be explained by the fact that there is a large number of trades during a day for this
ﬁrm size, and thus the insiders can hide better their trades, so that it takes more time
for liquidity providers to detect and react to the presence of insiders on the market.
This result is similar to the ﬁndings in Gleason (2007) where the author observes that
NASDAQ stocks with a larger number of dealers (i.e. larger stocks) are less affected
by insider trading in terms of bid-ask spread. Also, Khan et al. (2005) ﬁnds that for the
largest 100 NASDAQ stocks, the bid-ask spread widens with delay to insider sales,
and the authors interpret this results as dealers trying to recover their loss over time
after insider trading. A similar interpretation can be made for our results.
3.4.2 Cross-sectional analysis of CAI
To study more in details the determinants of Abnormal Illiquidity, we use a regression
framework where the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity is regressed on explanatory
variables. The following regression is performed:
CAIi = b0 + b1BUYi + b2Reti + b3Ret  BUYi + b4logHoldingi
+ b5logInsTrSzi + b6Volty3mi + b7MADi + ei, (3.3)60 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
Table 3.4: Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity on explanatory variables
This table shows the regression results of Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (CAI) on explanatory vari-
ables. BUY is a dummy variable indicating a purchase by insider. Ret is the return of the stock 10 days
prior to the insider trading event. RetBUY is an interaction variable between Ret and BUY. logHolding
is the log of the prior holding of the insider in shares scaled by the number of shares outstanding. logIn-
sTrSz is the log of the size of the trade in shares scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Volty3m
is the stock’s daily volatility computed three months prior to the insider trade. MAD is a dummy that
equals one after the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive. Stock ﬁxed-effects are used (not
shown). Robust t statistics are shown in brackets.
CAI-QS CAI-ES CAI-PI
BUY -0.0811 -0.0952 -0.0667
(-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.99)
Ret -3.0327 -2.3642 2.7150
(-1.90) (-2.39) (0.71)
RetBUY 1.0765 0.5080 -3.1341
(0.52) (0.35) (-0.73)
logHolding 0.0449 0.0362 -0.0178
(0.90) (0.78) (-0.37)
logInsTrSz -0.0273 -0.0245 -0.0118
(-1.57) (-1.56) (-0.89)
Volty3m -0.0020 0.1827 -1.0757
(-0.01) (0.91) (-2.08)
MAD -0.0519 0.0041 -0.0565
(-1.14) (0.18) (-1.10)
N 597 597 597
Adj. R2 0.0138 0.0085 0.0453
where CAIi is the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (either for quoted spread, effec-
tive spread or price impact) over day 0 and 110 for insider trading event i; BUYi is a
dummy variable indicating insider purchases, Reti is the average return of the stock
during 10 days prior to (but not including) the insider trading day; Ret  BUYi is an
interaction term to analyze the effect of stock return when there is an insider pur-
chase. logHoldingi and logInsTrSzi are the holding of the insider and the size of the
trade, respectively. Volty3mi is the volatility of the stock computed during the three
months prior to the event, and ﬁnally, MADi is a dummy that equals 1 after the im-
plementation of the Market Abuse Directive (October 2005). In this regression, we
use stock ﬁxed-effects, so the coefﬁcients estimated are to be interpreted as within
ﬁrm effects.11 Results are shown in Table 3.4.
The coefﬁcients of the purchase dummies are small, but for the price impact equa-
10CAI over day 0 and 1 is used as the dependent variable instead of simply the abnormal illiquidity
on day zero because if the trade by the insider occurs close to the closing time, or after the closing time,
other market participants might react to it the next trading day.
11Note that with this speciﬁcation, the cross-sectional determinants of the liquidity measures, like ﬁrm
size or trading volume, are captured by the unobserved effects.CHAPTER 3 61
tion, the dummy is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This result shows that when insiders
buy shares, they affect price impact to a lesser extent than when they sell. This is sur-
prising given that insider purchases are known to have higher information content
(in the sense that insider purchases can predict future stock returns, as shown in the
literature). But here, results show that market participants, on the short run, react
stronger when insiders sell shares than when they buy.
Looking at the coefﬁcient of Ret, we see that it is negative, large and signiﬁcant
for quoted spread and effective spread. Since the coefﬁcients of Reg  BUY are in-
signiﬁcant, it means that an insider trade following an increase in stock price affects
negatively the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity. In other terms, an insider trade af-
ter a run-up in price does not affect liquidity of the stock. But on the contrary, an
insider trade following a decrease in stock price strongly affects liquidity. It might be
that market participants are more nervous and are prone to withdraw liquidity after
a decline in prices.
The coefﬁcients on logHolding and on logInsTrSz are not signiﬁcant: the size of
the trade and the prior holding of the insider are not important to explain the liq-
uidity effects of their trades. Volty3m is important only for abnormal price impact,
with a negative coefﬁcient. This means that when insiders trade in periods of large
volatility, they affect less the price impact compared to periods of low volatility. This
can be understood as large volatilities can help the insider to hide better his trades to
other market participants. Or alternatively, when volatility is high, the price impact
is already higher than usual, as can be seen in Table 3.2, above.
The regression results show also that once we control for the relevant explanatory
factors, the effect of the Market Abuse Directive on the Abnormal Illiquidity is not
signiﬁcant. The new regulation does not help to reduce the impact of insider trading
on liquidity and price impact.
The results in this section can be summarized as follows. In a univariate analysis,
weﬁndthatsmallﬁrmsaretheonesforwhichliquidityreactsthemosttolegalinsider
trading: 5 basis points for the quoted and effective spread, and 10 basis points for the
price impact. For medium-sized ﬁrms, only the price impact increases. For large
ﬁrms, Figure 3.4 suggests that the CAI increase with a delay of a couple of days after
insider trading. This shows that in average, trades by insiders affect the liquidity of
their stocks and the permanent price impact around the dates at which they trade.
Next, we investigated what could be the determinants of this short-term change in
liquidity and price impact. A regression analysis with stock ﬁxed-effects shows that
the size of the insider trade and the insider’s prior holding do not affect abnormal
liquidity. The most important determinants of Abnormal Illiquidity is the return of
the stock prior to the trade by an insider: when the stock has negative returns prior to
the trade, the insider induces a larger effect on the quoted spread and effective spread.
And vice versa: when the stock increases before the trade, the effect of insider trading
on liquidity is reduced. The determinants of the abnormal price impact are different:62 LEGAL INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY
sales by insiders have a larger effect on price impact than purchases. Also, stock
volatility negatively explains abnormal price impact.
3.5 Conclusion
Insider trading is a regulated activity in most of the countries around the world. Even
if insiders are prohibited by law to trade upon private and price-sensitive informa-
tion, their trades are in average more information driven than those of outside in-
vestors. It is natural to think that even if insiders are not in possession of private and
price-sensitive information, they are nevertheless more knowledgeable about the fu-
ture prospects of their ﬁrm. In this chapter, we use legal trades by corporate insiders
to analyze whether the presence of insiders on the market affects liquidity measures
on the stock market as well as adverse selection. This study is done in the context of
a new European-wide regulation, the Market Abuse Directive, that enhanced market
surveillance and insider trading regulations. In order to do so, we use legal insider
trading data from the Netherlands on Dutch listed companies.
Using a ﬁrst approach, we perform a cross-sectional regression of the average liq-
uidity and price impact of each stock on their determinants and on a proxy for the
intensity, or prevalence, of insider trading. This allows us to estimate whether the
average liquidity and price impact are larger when insider trading is high, compared
to stocks where insider trading is low. We ﬁnd that intensity of insider trading is an
important determinant of stock market liquidity and adverse selection. Also, we ﬁnd
some evidence that the new regulation helps to reduce the effect of insider trading on
liquidity: after the implementation of the regulation, the variable intensity is a less
important factor explaining liquidity and price impact.
In a second approach, we focus on the short term, and we measure whether insider
trading affects liquidity and price impact on the days around their trades, compared
to a normal liquidity and price impact level. We ﬁnd that for small stocks, quoted
spread, effective spread and price impact are all affected immediately on the day of
insider trading. For medium ﬁrms, only the price impact changes on insider trading
dates, not the other liquidity measures. For large ﬁrms, we ﬁnd an impact but with a
delay of two to four days after the date of transaction, as if market participants react
late to the presence of a potentially informed trader. Finally, we test what could be
the determinants of the effect insiders have on liquidity and price impact when they
trade. For the quoted and effective spread, we ﬁnd that it is mostly the return of the
stock prior to the insider trading event that counts. For the price impact, we ﬁnd that
the effect induced by insiders depends on whether the trade is a purchase or a sale,
and also on the volatility of the stock prior to the trade.
An important contribution of this chapter is to test the ability of the new European
Union directive, implemented in the Netherlands as the Market Abuse Decree, to im-
prove liquidity and adverse selection. We ﬁnd that stock average liquidity and priceCHAPTER 3 63
impact are less affected by the intensity of insider trading after the implementation of
the regulation. This means that even if legal insider trading remains prevalent after
the regulation, outside traders do not ﬁnd it a threat and so liquidity and price impact
are less affected by it. This is true in average. Our second approach, looking speciﬁ-
cally on dates of insider trading, did not ﬁnd that liquidity and price impact are less
affected by insider trading after the regulation was passed.CHAPTER4
BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS1
Abstract
This paper analyzes block trades (the upstairs market) on Euronext Paris. Previous
studies concentrated on price effects and trading costs of block trades. We add to the
literature by investigating liquidity effects around block trades with the perspective
of market fragmentation. On the cross-sectional dimension, we show that stocks that
have an active upstairs market are more liquid and have a lower permanent price
impact compared to other stocks. We analyze the time-series dimension using panel
vector autoregression with daily measures of trading activity and liquidity. We ﬁnd
that over time, low liquidity on the main market does not induce investors to route
their orders to the upstairs market. The results show that the upstairs market is not
a substitute for the downstairs market, but is a complement. Overall, the ﬁndings
contradict the cream-skimming hypothesis in favor of the risk sharing hypothesis.
4.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes block trades (also called the upstairs market) on Euronext Paris.
Even though the Paris stock market is a fully computerized limit order book market,
the exchange provides facilities to negotiate and trade large blocks of shares through
brokers. Volumes on this upstairs market are economically signiﬁcant: on average,
about 8% of total trading volume is exchanged using blocks. Since a large part of
the order ﬂow is routed upstairs it is important to analyze the effect of this order
ﬂow fragmentation on market quality on the main market (i.e. the limit order book
market).
1Theauthor thankstheseminar participantsat FUCaM, atthe LouvainSchoolof Management, andat
SkemaBusinessSchool. ThischapterhasbeenpresentedattheEuroﬁdai-AFFIDecember2010meetings.
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We test the cream skimming versus the risk sharing hypothesis. According to the
cream-skimming hypothesis, uninformed order ﬂow is diverted to the upstairs mar-
ket, and as a consequence liquidity providers on the downstairs market face a higher
information risk, and in turn market liquidity is reduced. In other words, this hypoth-
esis states that order ﬂow fragmentation leads to lower liquidity and to higher infor-
mation asymmetry. The opposite hypothesis, called risk sharing, states that the up-
stairs market induces trades that would not occur without this facility, thus providing
extra beneﬁts to investors without reducing market liquidity. According the this hy-
pothesis, market fragmentation leads to larger order ﬂow without altering negatively
liquidity and information asymmetry. The cream-skimming versus risk-sharing hy-
pothesis has been studied in various other settings, notably for the effect of purchased
order ﬂow (Easley et al., 1996), the order routing to regional exchanges (Bessembinder
and Kaufman, 1997b) and the effect of crossing networks (Gresse, 2006).
There are additional theoretical interests for studying block trades.2 In recent
years, we have witnessed important changes in the landscape of capital markets.
Many Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) (also called Multilateral Trading Facility
or MTF) have emerged thanks to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or
MiFID, in Europe, and to Regulation National Market System, or RegNMS, in the
US. Many of these ATS are dark pools, also called Crossing Networks. Examples are
Liquidnet, Turquoise, Smart Pool. The main question is whether this trade fragmen-
tation will ultimately prove to enhance liquidity or not. Although a growing body
of literature focuses on the effect of fragmentation due to these new trading venues
(see Degryse et al. (2006) for an overview), to our knowledge very few papers have
studied the direct effect of block trades on market liquidity.
Previous literature on block trading mostly analyzed the differential in trading
costs between the upstairs market and the main market. The ﬁrst paper to be written
on this topic is Kraus and Stoll (1972). Many papers have followed the lead, among
them Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004), Keim and Madhavan (1996), Smith
et al. (2001), and most recently, Oriol (2008). With the exception of this last paper,
this string of literature has not focused on the effect of order ﬂow fragmentation, but
mainly on trading costs differentials and price effects related to upstairs trading. Our
paper has the additional focus of analyzing liquidity effects related to block trading,
in the sense that we investigate whether liquidity on the main market has a role in
explaining order ﬂow fragmentation and vice versa.
In addition to the empirical literature, a certain number of theoretical papers ex-
2Block trades are not to be confused with block holders, which, following stock market regulation,
have to disclose their holdings when they cross some reference holding levels (e.g. 5%, 10%, etc.) In
the corporate ﬁnance literature, such block holders are said to exercise a control power, which might
also impact on liquidity. But this paper relates to generic block trades that are executed on the upstairs
market, and not to trades that pertain to block holders. Whether block holders affect liquidity when
they trade is outside the scope of this paper.CHAPTER 4 67
ploretheeconomicroleoftheupstairsbrokersandtraders. BurdettandO’Hara(1987)
ﬁnd that there are two implicit costs to using the upstairs market: the search cost
and the probability of information leakage while searching for a counterparty. Seppi
(1990) models the choice of a liquidity trader to either split his order into smaller
ones and to submit them on the main market, or to use the upstairs market for block
trades, where anonymity is not guaranteed. The author shows that a liquidity trader
would rather disclose his type (liquidity trader, as opposed to informed trader) in or-
der to face only the order processing cost of the upstairs market, and save the adverse
selection cost that is implicit in downstairs trading. Through repeated interactions
with upstairs brokers, a liquidity trader can be recognized as such and obtain better
prices. This gives rise to the “certiﬁcation hypothesis”, by which an upstairs traders
is certiﬁed to be liquidity motivated, and not information motivated. Also, Grossman
(1992)’s model states that block orders are a way to “tap into unexpressed liquidity”.
This implies that upstairs trades should be cheaper than large downstairs market
trades. This has been conﬁrmed in the empirical literature cited above. While these
models are key to understand the behavior of upstairs brokers and traders, they do
not give a deﬁnite answer to how the upstairs market inﬂuence liquidity on the main
market. Our paper intends to ﬁll this gap.
In this paper, market liquidity is measured by the quoted bid-ask spread and the
effective spread. We measure the informational content of trades by the permanent
priceimpact(whichproxiesforinformationasymmetry). Inacross-sectionalanalysis,
controlling for known determinants of market liquidity and price impact, we measure
the effect of block trading activity on these variables. We show that more block trades
increases liquidity (i.e. decreases the quoted spread and the effective spread) and re-
duces the price impact. In addition, time series analysis show that this increase in
liquidity is not due to periods with more overall market liquidity and low upstairs
trading. This result contradicts the would be cream-skimming role of the upstairs
market. In order to further assess the risk sharing role of the upstairs market, we ana-
lyze the order ﬂow creation due to block trading. According to this hypothesis, order
ﬂow on the upstairs market is not diverted from the downstairs market, but instead
reﬂects new order ﬂow that would not have occurred without the upstairs market fa-
cility. Ifthishypothesisisvalid, volumeonthedownstairsmarketwouldnotbelower
for stocks with block trades compared to stocks without block trades (controlling for
other determinants of trading volume). This is precisely what we ﬁnd: a regression of
trading volume on its determinants and on block trading activity shows that stocks
with an active upstairs market do not have lower trading volume on the downstairs
market. This shows that the upstairs trading facility does not lead to a reduction of
order ﬂow on the main market and is thus consistent with its risk sharing role. A sim-
ple cross-sectional analysis of block trading and liquidity might hide dynamic effects
between these two variables across days. For example, even if on average stocks that
have an active upstairs market have also higher liquidity, it is well possible that on68 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
days when liquidity is low on the main market, investors prefer to use the upstairs
market. This would be an example of a substitution effect between the two trading
facilities: investors simply trade where the trading costs are lower. For this reason,
we use a panel of 278 stocks in a reduced form vector autoregression (VAR) setting to
analyze the dynamics between downstairs trading, liquidity and upstairs trading.
The use of the panel VAR methodology is quite new in ﬁnance. It has been used
recently in the macroeconomic and macro-ﬁnance literature. An example is Love and
Zicchino (2006). But to our knowledge, it is new in the microstructure literature. The
VAR methodology has been used extensively since its introduction in the microstruc-
ture literature by Hasbrouck (1988, 1991). But it has not been applied to a panel of
several stocks. The main advantage of the panel setup is that is allows to estimate an
effect that is deemed common between several stocks by averaging out stock-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity. Applying the panel VAR methodology with daily data on
trading and liquidity allows us to investigate liquidity effects related to block trading.
Our main result is that the upstairs market and the downstairs market are comple-
ments, and not substitutes. This contradicts the cream-skimming hypothesis in favor
of the risk-sharing hypothesis.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains
the institutional features of Euronext Paris and the upstairs market. Section 4.3 ex-
plains the methodology used, and econometric issues. Section 4.4 explains in more
details the hypotheses that are tested in order to determine whether the upstairs mar-
ket cream skims uninformed order ﬂow, or if it enhances risk sharing. Then, Sections
4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the cross-sectional and panel time series estimation
frameworks, respectively. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Institutional features
The data used in this study consists of the block trades reported by Euronext Paris
through the transaction publication and reporting service, known as Transaction Con-
ﬁrmation Service (TCS) (henceforth the TCS database). These include block trades
related to stocks listed on Euronext Paris (including stocks listed elsewhere but cross-
listed in Paris). We use data from the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 (three months of data).
In the paper, block trades are deﬁned as large trades that are not executed on the
central limit order book of Euronext (also called “off-order book trades"), but that are
deemed from a regulatory point of view to be effected on Euronext regulated mar-
kets. To be eligible as block trades, the participation of an exchange member (i.e. a
broker) is necessary (Article 19 of EU Regulation 1287/2006). This means that OTC
and privately negotiated deals are not part of our block trades dataset. Also, regu-
lation stipulates that only large trades are allowed to be considered as block trades.
The required size is deﬁned on a stock-by-stock basis, according to past average daily
tradingvolume(Article 20ofEURegulation1287/2006). A keyfeatureofblocktradesCHAPTER 4 69
is that they are not subject to pre-trade transparency rules, i.e. no bid and offer prices,
nor depth, have to be published (Article 29 and 44 of EU Regulation 1287/2006).
The price of the shares exchanged by a block trade is also regulated. It is in refer-
ence to the market price on the main market. Article 18 of EU Regulation 1287/2006
stipulates that the price should lie within the volume weighted average spread on
the order book. But in practice, there are two different possible price regimes, to be
decided between the client(s) and the broker. One possibility is to take as reference
price the value weighted average price, computed in a pre-deﬁned period on the
main market. Otherwise, the price is subject to negotiation but in any case it should
fall between the volume-weighted average bid and ask spread in the limit order book.
There are three main types of block trades. The ﬁrst type includes exercise of op-
tions and derivative trades (type D and L in the database). This category has been
created to facilitate institutions that have to trade large quantity of shares due to
derivatives, or for hedging purposes (delta neutral trades). This type of trade is less
interesting because not all companies have block trades of this category (only large
ones that have derivatives). In this paper, we discard these block trades. The second
type of block trades is what is called “VWAP" trades (type E in the database). These
aretradesforwhichthepriceisdeterminedbyvalueweightedaveragerule. Thethird
type of block trade is called negotiated trade (type G, H and O). Block trades can re-
sult from an exchange between two parties that are clients of an exchange member
(client trades), or between a member and a client (principal trades). The price is due
to be set according to an agreement between the two parties.
Concerningpost-tradetransparency, therearetwodifferentregimesinwhichblock
trades can reside. The ﬁrst one is when the exchange member acts as a broker for a
trade between two clients. In this regime, trades are published immediately. If the
member acts as principal, then the publication delay depends on the size of the trade
compared to the average trading volume of the stock (this includes negotiated trades
and VWAP trades). For block trades under the regime of immediate publication, if the
trade occurs outside trading hours, the publication is delayed until the next morning,
but before opening of the exchange.3
Regulation and trading rules do not specify other criteria that have to be met in
order for a stock to be eligible to trade on the upstairs market. In principle, any stock
is admissible to upstairs trading, as long as a market member is willing to act as a
broker. We refer to Oriol (2008) for further information about the institutional details
of the Euronext upstairs market.
3Unfortunately, we do not have data on the precise disclosure time of block trades, so we cannot
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4.3 Data and methodology
This section is concerned with describing the data and the methodology used for
liquidity measures and econometric speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst explain the ﬁlters used
and describe the sample of stocks that will be used throughout the analysis. Then, we
explain the panel VAR methodology.
In addition to the TCS (block trades) database, we use intraday trades and best bid
and ask quotes for Euronext Paris, for months January to March 2007. We match the
stocks with the Datastream database to obtain market capitalization and the free ﬂoat
proportion of shares outstanding.
We use some ﬁlters on the ﬁrms that we use for this study. First, we discard stocks
that are not traded continuously, or that are from the Alternext4 listing (even if con-
tinuously traded). This makes a total of 549 stocks. Then, the companies must have a
match with market capitalization and free ﬂoat variables taken from Datastream (496
stocks). Since this paper concentrates on the most liquid stocks, we require that each
company trades every day in the sample period, i.e. 64 days (436 stocks). We also
drop stocks that have an average price over the sample that is lower than 50 cents or
higher than 500 euros (429 stocks). Finally, we drop stocks that have an average of
less than 5 trades per day during the sample period, to ensure a liquidity level high
enough. The resulting number of stocks is 410.
We now show some descriptive statistics. For clarity, all variables used are deﬁned
in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 shows the number of stocks in the sample, broken down into
three market capitalization terciles. The table shows as well some descriptive statis-
tics at the cross-sectional level. We see that about two thirds of the stocks have an
active upstairs market (278 out of 410), and the proportion of stocks with block trades
increases with market capitalization.
The overall average market capitalization in the sample is 6.8 billion euros, with
an average of 65 million euros for the small cap category, and an average of about
20 billion euros for the large cap category. We see also that the average stock price
increases with market capitalization. The free ﬂoat proportion of shares also increases
with market capitalization, meaning that small stocks are more tightly held than large
stocks, althoughtheproportionofsharesheldbyinstitutionsisstillsubstantiallylarge
even for large stocks. In the empirical analysis, we use some control variables in logs.
This is why we show in Table 4.2 the variables both in levels and in logs.
Looking more closely at block trades from Table 4.2, we see that the number of
days with block trades is quite low for small and medium stocks (3% and 9% of days,
respectively, over the size category). For large stocks, this proportion is much larger:
up to 61% of days with block trades. Even though the volume traded upstairs is lower
than the volume traded on the main market, the size of blocks is substantially larger
than the size of downstairs trades: block trades are in average 64 times larger than
4AlternextisastockexchangethatbelongstoNYSEEuronextwithlessstringentlistingrequirements.CHAPTER 4 71
Table 4.1: Deﬁnition of variables
This table shows the deﬁnition of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Cross-sectional variables
MCAP Market capitalization at the beginning the the calendar year (in thousands Euro)
logMCAP Log of market capitalization
AVGVOL Average daily trading volume in shares on the main market
logAVGVOL Log of AVGVOL
AVGNbrTr Average number of trades on the main market
logAVGNbrTr Log of AVGNbrTr
PRICE Average of closing price during the sample period.
PRICEinv One over PRICE
VOLTY Daily volatility during the sample period
FreeFloat Free ﬂoat proportion of shares outstanding
BLKdum Dummy variable deﬁned as one if the stock has block trades during the sample
period, or zero otherwise
BLKprop Proportion of total volume that is traded on the upstairs market
AVGQS Average of relative half quoted spread
AVGES Average of relative half effective spread
AVGPI Average of relative half price impact
Daily variables
AbsR Absolute return of the stock in percentage points.
QS Relative half quoted spread
ES Relative half effective spread
PI Relative half price impact
NbrTr Number of trades on the main market
logNbrTr Log of NbrTr
NbrBlk Number of block trades
logNbrBlk Log of NbrBlk
NbrBlkDH Number of block trades during normal market hours
logNbrBlkDH Log of NbrBlkDH
NbrBlkAH Number of block trades after normal market hours





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We use two different liquidity measures and one measure of adverse selection that
are standard in the market microstructure literature5 that are computed on a daily
basis. The Quoted Spread (QS) is half the average difference between the best ask










where QSd is the quoted spread on day d; n is the number of quote updates during
the day; aski and bidi are the best ask price and best bid price for each quotes, respec-
tively; mi is the average between the best ask and the best bid (also called the quote
mid-point). The Effective Spread (ES) is the average of the difference between the









where in this case, n is the number of trades on day d, and pi is the price of the trade.
The adverse selection measure is the permanent price impact, or Price Impact (PI) for
short. This measure is the average of the mid-quote change 30 minutes after each








where n is again the number of trades on day d, and the index i + t means that the
quote mid-point is the last available mid-point 30 minutes after the trade i. qi is a
buy/sell indicator that equals 1 if trade i is a purchase, and -1 if it is a sale. The price
impact measure expresses the loss to liquidity providers dues to information asym-
metry. Figure 4.1 helps to understand the meaning of these measures by showing an
example of a purchase.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the spread measures
Thisﬁgureillustratestheliquiditymeasures. A isthebestaskquote, B isthebestbidquote, m isthemid-
quote and T is the price at which the trade executes. The quoted spread is half the difference between A
and B. The effective spread is the difference between the transaction price T and the quote mid-point m.
The trade occurs at time t. At time t + n the price impact (the difference between the quote mid-point
at the time of the trade and the future quote mid-point) is measured. Note that in this ﬁgure, the trade
occurs at the prevailing ask price, A. On Euronext, many purchases occur above the quoted ask price,












Concerning liquidity measures, we see from Table 4.2 that the quoted spread is
somewhat smaller than the effective spread, and both are decreasing with market
capitalization, consistent with the notion that larger stocks are typically more liquid.
The price impact, PI, can be seen as the proﬁts to informed traders. We see that it is
larger for small ﬁrms. This is consistent with the view that small ﬁrms suffer more
from adverse selection than large ﬁrms, since they are typically more opaque, and
less followed by the press and by analysts.
Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics on a daily basis. These statistics are relevant
for the panel data analysis. Variables shown are deﬁned in Table 4.1. “Mean” is the
pooled average of the variables across ﬁrms and time. The standard deviation shown
is broken down in three: the overall standard deviation, which is the pooled standard
deviation; the “Between” statistic is the standard deviation across stocks, and the
“Within” statistic shows how the variables change across time within a typical stock.
Only stocks that have an active upstairs market are used in this table. The top part ofCHAPTER 4 75
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics – Time series
This table shows descriptive statistics for panel data. The top table uses data from stocks that have
upstairs trading activity during the sample period (278 stocks). The bottom table uses data for stocks
that have block trades both during normal trading hours as well as after closing time (195 stocks).
Panel A: Stocks With Block Trades (278)
Variable Mean St-dev
Overall Between Within
AbsR 1.20 1.35 0.40 1.29
QS 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.15
ES 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.13
PI 0.077 0.097 0.060 0.077
NbrTr 589 1,063 962 457
logNbrTr 4.89 1.88 1.81 0.53
NbrBlk 0.94 2.35 1.73 1.60
logNbrBlk 0.37 0.64 0.54 0.34
Panel B: Stocks With Block Trades During Normal Trading Hours
and After Market Close (195)
Variable Mean St-dev
Overall Between Within
AbsR 1.19 1.32 0.36 1.27
QS 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.11
ES 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.09
PI 0.053 0.062 0.039 0.048
NbrTr 820 1,196 1,068 544
logNbrTr 5.61 1.67 1.61 0.48
NbrBlkDH 0.64 1.90 1.02 1.60
logNbrBlkDH 0.27 0.54 0.35 0.42
NbrBlkAH 0.68 1.29 0.97 0.85
logNbrBlkAH 0.35 0.53 0.43 0.31
the table (Panel A) uses stocks that have upstairs trades, either during normal trading
hours or after the closing of the main market. The bottom of the table shows statistics
using stocks that have upstairs trades both during normal trading hours and after the
closing time, to be consistent with the empirical analysis of Section 4.6.
In spite of few exceptions, the variables shown have usually a between standard
deviation that is larger than the within standard deviation. This shows that there is
heterogeneity across ﬁrms. A panel data analysis is thus warranted.
4.3.1 Methodology
This paper uses two main methodologies for the empirical analysis. The ﬁrst is a
cross-sectional regression. In this approach, each observation represents one stock and
is measured as the average value of the variable over time. This methodology aims at76 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
capturing the difference between stocks.
Since we are also interested in the effect of block trades on an inter-day basis, we
use as a second methodology a panel vector autoregression, or panel VAR.6 There are
two main advantages of this methodology. First, it allows to capture the dynamic ef-
fect of trading on liquidity from day to day without assuming a structural model. In
other words, we “let the data speak” and see how the different variables affect each
other through time. The second advantage is that it takes into account heterogeneity
across ﬁrms by averaging out an unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect. This is especially
interesting in a dynamic setting because we want to understand the overall effect of
trading on liquidity for the average ﬁrm, without being bothered by ﬁrm-speciﬁc ef-
fects. The alternative would be to estimate a dynamic model for each ﬁrm, and then
aggregating somehow the estimated coefﬁcients, which would be very cumbersome.
The panel VAR “integrates out” the differences between ﬁrms and, as a result, it pro-
vides a general dynamic effect between the variables.
We will ﬁrst explain how the VAR is performed, and then we will explain how
we treat ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved effects. A VAR is a system of regression equations
that are estimated simultaneously. The special feature is that all the equations have
the same explanatory variables. Therefore, it shares many aspects with SURE mod-
els (seemingly unrelated regression equations), including the estimation procedure,
which is done by GLS. The right-hand side variables are simply the lag values of the
variables included in the system. For example, a VAR with two variables and one lag
can be written this way:
xt = b0 + b11xt 1 + b12yt 1 + #1,t (4.4)
yt = b1 + b21xt 1 + b22yt 1 + #2,t, (4.5)
where it is assumed that the error terms are not serially correlated (i.e. we assume
that the equations capture all the dynamic effects between the variables, such that
the residuals are white noise), but contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation is al-
lowed. For example, in the analysis, we use a VAR with 4 variables: daily absolute
return, number of trades on the main market, daily effective spread, and number of
block trades. This means that there are 4 equations, and in each equation, all lagged
variables are used as explanatory variables.
We can write the system (4.4)-(4.5) in matrix form as follows:
zt = B0 + B1zt 1 + #t, (4.6)
where zt is a 21 vector of variables, B0 is a 2  1 vector of intercepts, B1 is a 2  2
matrix of coefﬁcients, and #t is a 2  1 vector of error terms. The variance-covariance
matrix of residuals, S, is of size 2  2. This means that for a system of n variables
6A good introduction to VAR can be found in Brooks (2008). A more advanced treatment can be
found a.o. in Hamilton (1994) and Lütkepohl (2005).CHAPTER 4 77
and p lags, there are n(np + 1) coefﬁcients to estimate and n(n + 1)/2 parameters
in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals. This gives a quite large number of
parameters to interpret, as the number of variables included in the system becomes
large.
For this reason, care has to be taken for choosing the number of lags. In order to
do so, we use the standard information criteria AIC, SBIC and HQIC, in their multi-
variate version. When two criteria suggest to use a different number of lags, we take
the most parsimonious model.
The large number of estimated parameters make the results difﬁcult to interpret.
Instead of interpreting each coefﬁcient one by one, we use two main tools to analyze
the results. The ﬁrst one is the Granger causality test. This is an inference of whether
lags of variable x help to explain the current value of variable y. This test is performed
by an F test, i.e. a test that all the coefﬁcients of the lags of x are jointly zero. If the
null hypothesis is rejected, we say that x Granger-causes y. Note that there can also
be Granger causality from y to x. In this case, we say that the Granger causality is
bi-directional.
Thesecondtoolfortheinterpretationoftheresultsistoanalyzetheorthogonalized
impulse-response functions. This method shows visually what is the effect on the
system of a hypothetical shock to one of the variables. This effect is shown graphically
by plotting the response of each variable to a shock in a given variable. For a system
of n equations, there are n2 impulse-response functions. This is complementary to
the Granger causality test because it shows the sign (or the direction) of the effect, as
well as how long it takes for the shock to die out, assuming the system is stable. The
results of the orthogonalized impulse-response functions depend on the ordering of
the variables. Thus, some robustness analyses are warranted in order to make sure
the results hold for different speciﬁcations.
In order to extend the VAR methodology to a panel framework, we need to take
into account a ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved effect. In traditional panel econometric mod-
els, one method is to use the so-called ﬁxed-effect transform, or mean-differencing
procedure. This is simply done by subtracting each variable in the equation by its
mean. But in a dynamic framework like the VAR, this procedure introduces an esti-
mation bias because the ﬁxed effects are correlated with the regressors thanks to the
lag values of the dependent variable in each equation of the VAR. To overcome this
problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose to use the forward orthogonal deviation
(FOD). This is done by subtracting the forward mean, instead of the overall mean.
Since this forward mean, which is computed with future values of the variables at
each point in time, is by construction orthogonal to its own lagged values, it is a well
suited candidate to take away the stock-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects.7 The FOD is computed
7The literature on dynamic panel models also suggests to use system GMM estimation and use
lagged values and lagged differences of the regressors as instrumental variables. But this method is
















t is the forward orthogonal deviation of xt, and Tt is the number of future
observations of the variable. Once the FOD is obtained for each variable, we simply
pool the transformed data in order to estimate the VAR.
Before to provide empirical results, in the next section we explain in details the
hypotheses that will be tested.
4.4 Hypotheses
The hypotheses that will be tested in this paper are explained here in more details.
The following diagram shows what effects fragmentation can produce.
 
Fragmentation 
Order flow creation 
Risk-sharing 
Order flow substitution 
Cream-skimming 
On the one hand, fragmentation can lead to order ﬂow substitution, which means
that investors will choose to route their orders to the venue that suits best their needs.
Previous research has shown that the upstairs market is able to discriminate informed
versus uninformed order ﬂow and to take some of the latter (see e.g. Madhavan and
Cheng, 1997, Seppi, 1990). This means that part of the uninformed order ﬂow is
routed to the upstairs market and the main market suffers more from adverse se-
lection, thus lowering liquidity. This is called the cream-skimming effect.
On the other hand, fragmentation could lead to order ﬂow creation. The rationale
is that the upstairs market might bring new trading opportunities, which give some
investorsincentivestotradethatwouldnotexistwithoutthisalternativemarket. This
effect leads to increased risk-sharing in the economy.
These two effects of fragmentation are not mutually exclusive. There might be a
substitution effect at the same time as an order ﬂow creation effect. Our goal is to
analyze empirically which one of these two effects is the strongest, both in the cross-
section and over time.
quite large, and a too large number of instruments hampers the efﬁciency of the estimation procedure.
Also, it is shown in this literature that the endogeneity bias in dynamic panel models is less important
when the time dimension is large, as it is with the data used in this paper. See Love and Zicchino (2006)
for an example of an application of panel VAR using system GMM estimation.CHAPTER 4 79
Oneofourtestsofcream-skimmingversusrisk-sharingisinspiredbyGresse(2006).
In a cross-sectional framework, we measure the effect of the existence of an upstairs
market on the liquidity of the main market. If the effect of having an active upstairs
market is to increase liquidity, then the risk-sharing hypothesis is the strongest. If on
the contrary liquidity is negatively related to the existence of an upstairs market, then
the cream-skimming hypothesis is the strongest.
Hypothesis 1 (Cream-skimming or risk-sharing). In a cross-sectional regression frame-
work, estimate the effect of having an active upstairs market on downstairs liquidity (control-
ling for other factors known to explain liquidity).
 If the effect of upstairs market is to increase (decrease) liquidity, then the risk-sharing
(cream-skimming) hypothesis prevails.
To test more speciﬁcally the order creation effect, a similar test can be done for
volume.
Hypothesis 2 (Order creation or substitution). In a cross-sectional regression framework,
estimate the effect of having an active upstairs market on downstairs share volume or number
of trades (controlling for other factors known to explain volume).
 If the effect of upstairs market is to increase (decrease) volume/number of trades, then
the order creation (substitution) effect prevails.
The previous cross-sectional effects are interesting because they show what is the
average liquidity and trading volume effect of having an active upstairs market. What
we now want to analyze is the intertemporal effect of block trades using daily obser-
vations on liquidity and trading activity. The general question is: How does block
trades inﬂuence downstairs liquidity and trading activity? Both contemporaneous
and time series effects are analyzed.
In order to investigate this, we use the panel vector autoregression (VAR) method-
ology (see Section 4.3 above). Using daily data, this methodology allows us to un-
cover the dynamics between the variables included in the VAR (i.e. absolute return,
number of trades on the main market, liquidity, and number of block trades). The
following hypotheses are tested with the results of the VAR regression:
Hypothesis 3 (Order ﬂow substitution between upstairs and downstairs market). In
a panel V AR regression framework, measure the dynamic effect between downstairs liquidity
and upstairs trading activity.
1. If downstairs liquidity has an impact on (is independent of) upstairs trading activity,
then order ﬂow substitution hypothesis holds (does not hold).
2. If downstairs volume negatively (positively) impacts upstairs volume, then there is or-
der ﬂow substitution (creation).
Since there is a non negligible part of the upstairs order ﬂow that executes after80 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
normaltradinghours, weseparatetheupstairsblocktradesbetweenopeningmarkets
hoursandafter-hours, andwetestagainthesubstitutionhypothesisusingpanelVAR,
this time with ﬁve variables.
Hypothesis 4 (Fragmentation: overnight upstairs activity). In a panel V AR regression
framework, measure the dynamic effect between downstairs liquidity and upstairs after-hours
trading activity.
1. Ifdownstairsliquidityhasanimpacton(isindependentof)after-hoursupstairstrading,
then there is (no) order ﬂow substitution.
2. If downstairs volume negatively (positively) impacts after-hours upstairs trading activ-
ity, then there is order ﬂow substitution (creation).
4.5 Cross-sectional results
The main hypothesis to test is whether an upstairs market contributes to cream-
skimming or to risk sharing. To test this, we follow the method used in Gresse (2006),
i.e. a cross-sectional regression (one observation per stock) of average liquidity on
explanatory variables with a dummy variable that identiﬁes stocks with an active
upstairs market.8 The regression that we perform is the following:
LIQi = b0 + b1logMCAPi + b2logAVGVOLi + b3PRICEinvi + b4VOLTYi
+ b5FreeFloati + #i, (4.7)
whereLIQi isthethreeliquiditymeasuresthatweuse: averagequotedspread(AVGQS),
averageeffectivespread(AVGES)andaveragepermanentpriceimpact(AVGPI).logM-
CAP is the log of market capitalization of the stock at the beginning of the sample;
logAVGVOL is the log of the average trading volume per day on the main market;
VOLTY is the volatility of the daily returns computed during the sample period;
FreeFloat9 is the proportion of the stock that is freely available to investors, i.e. not
owned by controlling parties or institutional investors (data taken from Datastream).
To the above regression model, we add the variable BLKdum, which is a dummy
variable that indicates whether the stock has an active upstairs market or not (=1 if
there is at least one block trade during the sample period). This model captures the
effect of having an active upstairs market on liquidity and price impact. In addition,
we estimate a regression model that includes BLKdum as well as a continuous vari-
able that measures the proportion of total volume that is traded upstairs (BLKprop).
8This cross-sectional regression of the determinants of liquidity and transaction costs is standard in
the market microstructure literature. See e.g. Huang and Stoll (1996), Venkataraman (2001).
9Adding the free ﬂoat proportion of shares outstanding to the cross-sectional regression is motivated
by the ﬁndings of Heﬂin and Shaw (2000).CHAPTER 4 81
In this last speciﬁcation, the dummy BLKdum captures the difference between ﬁrms
with block trades and ﬁrms without block trades, and the BLKprop variable captures
the effect of having a larger part of orders executed upstairs.
Results are shown in Panel A of Table 4.4. We see that the sign and signiﬁcance
of control variables are what is expected from the literature. Namely, the spread
and price impact measures are negative functions of market capitalization, average
trading volume, average stock price and free ﬂoat proportion of shares, and positive
functions of volatility. Models (2), (6) and (10) in the table shows the same regression
but with the upstairs market activity dummy variable. We see that control variables
do not change sign and signiﬁcance when adding the dummy variable. Firms that
have an active upstairs market have a lower average spread (thus larger average liq-
uidity) and a lower price impact. The magnitude is about half of the cross-sectional
standard deviation (compare the coefﬁcient of the dummy variables with the descrip-
tive statistics provided in Table 4.2), and very signiﬁcant (t statistics of more than 5 in
absolute value). We see from models (3), (7) and (11), however, that the proportion of
total volume traded upstairs does not explain liquidity and permanent price impact
on the main market. The coefﬁcients are small with low t statistics. But the coefﬁcient
of BLKdum keeps its size and signiﬁcance as in model (2), (6) and (10). These results
show that it is the fact of having an upstairs market that counts, not the size of this
upstairs market.
The above regression is potentially subject to an endogeneity bias, as traders and
broker might self-select to trade on the upstairs market. For example, brokers might
decidetomakeanupstairsmarketforﬁrmsthathavespeciﬁccharacteristics, andthus
the sample of ﬁrms might not be random. The consequence is that the coefﬁcient on
BLKdum in the above regression would be biased. To correct this self-selection bias,
we use a regression model in the spirit of Heckman (1979).10 The procedure consists
of estimating in a ﬁrst stage a probit model that explains the determinants of having
an active upstairs market. The equation of this ﬁrst stage regression is as follows:
Pr[BLKdumi = 1] = F

g0 + g1logMCAPi + g2logAVGVOLi + g3PRICEinvi
+ g4VOLTYi + g5FreeFloati

, (4.8)
where F() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Explanatory
variables are: the log of market capitalization; the log of the average downstairs daily
trading volume; the inverse of the average price during the period; daily volatility;
and the free ﬂoat proportion of shares outstanding. In a second stage, the conditional
probability of having an upstairs market is added to the regression of the determi-
nants of liquidity and permanent price impact. This probability is obtained by the
10For a recent use of this methodology in ﬁnance, see Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007). See also Li
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), simply added as regressor in regression equation 4.7.
The results of the selectivity-adjusted model are exposed in Table 4.4, Panel A,
models (4), (8) and (12). Panel B of the same table shows the results of the probit re-
gression 4.8. This regression shows that the variables affecting positively the decision
by market participants to trade on the upstairs market are average trading volume
downstairs and the stock price level. We see also that the volatility of the stock re-
turn and the free ﬂoat proportion of shares outstanding affect negatively the choice
of having an active upstairs market. The market capitalization of the ﬁrm does not
have a signiﬁcant effect on the choice of having an active upstairs market. In the sec-
ond stage, i.e. the selectivity-adjusted regression, we ﬁnd that the effect of having an
active upstairs market is stronger than what was obtained in the regression without
taking into account the endogeneity bias. This means that for the average ﬁrm, hav-
ing an active upstairs market improves liquidity and reduces information asymmetry
to a greater extent than what was thought. The coefﬁcients of BLKdum in the quoted
spread and effective spread regressions is -0.53%, which is more than twice the coefﬁ-
cient obtained in models (2) and (6) (-0.12 and -0.13 in the quoted spread and effective
spread regressions, respectively). Similar results are obtained for the permanent price
impact (-0.23 in the selectivity-adjusted regression, compared to -0.06 in model (10)).
These results show that the upstairs market does not cream-skim uninformed or-
der ﬂow, in average. On the contrary, it helps to increase liquidity, which is con-
sistent with the risk sharing hypothesis. We now test Hypothesis 2, which asks the
question whether block trading activity increases downstairs trading volume. In a
cross-sectional analysis, we perform the following regression:
volumei = b0 + b1logMCAPi + b2PRICEinvi + b3VOLTYi + b4FreeFloati
+ b5AVGQSi + b6AVGPIi + #i. (4.9)
The model is estimated with two different dependent variables as a proxy for trad-
ing activity on the main market: the log of average daily trading volume in shares
(logAVGVOL) and the log of average daily number of trades (logAVGNbrTr). The
regression model uses liquidity and adverse selection measures as explanatory vari-
ables, but we exclude the average effective spread from the equation because it is
highly correlated with the average quoted spread. Results are shown in Table 4.5.
For each dependent variable, three models are estimated: models (1) and (5) show
the determinants of trading activity, and models (2) and (6) add a dummy variable
indicating that the stock has an active upstairs market (at least one day with upstairs
block trades during the sample). Models (3) and (7) include additionally the propor-
tion of shares traded upstairs relative to the total daily trading volume (BLKprop).
We see that the coefﬁcient of the dummy variable is positive and largely signiﬁcant (t
statistic above 4) for each speciﬁcation. This shows that ﬁrms with an active upstairs
market have a higher volume traded on the main market, other things being equal.84 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
The coefﬁcients of BLKprop in models (3) and (7), although negative, are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. These results might be biased because of self-selection. Therefore,
we perform a selectivity-adjusted regression for volume, in a similar fashion as for
the liquidity regression.
The ﬁrst stage of the selectivity-adjusted analysis is a probit regression for the de-
terminants of having an active upstairs market. The regression is different than the
one in Panel B of Table 4.4 because it is not possible to use downstairs volume as a
regressor for identiﬁcation reasons. We therefore perform the following probit regres-
sion:
Pr[BLKdumi = 1] = F

p0 + p1logMCAPi + p2PRICEinvi + p4VOLTYi
+ p5FreeFloati + p6AVGQSi + p7AVGESi

. (4.10)
Table 4.5, Panel B, shows results of the probit regression. The most important
variables explaining the choice of trading in the upstairs market are the inverse of
the stock price, the free ﬂoat proportion of shares, and the permanent price impact.
Adding the inverse Mill’s ratio in the regression for the determinants of downstairs
volume (Table 4.5, Panel A, models (4) and (8)) shows that having an active upstairs
market does not induce a higher trading volume on the main market: the coefﬁcient
for BLKdum is small and unsigniﬁcant. This is in contrast with the results of the
simple OLS regressions (models (2) and (6)). We see that controlling for self-selection
is important. As a result, we cannot conclude that the upstairs market help for order
ﬂow creation and risk sharing.
The two previous hypotheses showed that in average, having an upstairs market
for block trades increases stock liquidity and decreases adverse selection, and thus
doesnotcream-skimthemarket. Butanactiveupstairsmarketisnotassociatedwitha
higher trading level on the main market. However, these are cross-sectional averages,
anditmighthidecream-skimmingandorderﬂowsubstitutioneffectsonaday-to-day
basis. This will be investigated more closely in the next section.
As a ﬁnal cross-sectional analysis, we investigate whether the upstairs market
helpstodecreaseliquidityshocksinthecross-section. Hypothesis1analyzedwhether
block trades reduce the level of liquidity. But now we investigate whether stocks with
an active upstairs market have a lower variation in liquidity. The motivation for this
test is the following: the asset pricing and liquidity literature suggests that not only
the level of liquidity is important for the valuation of stocks, but also the variation
in liquidity. Thus we ask the following question: does an active upstairs market re-
duce the variation in liquidity? This is an important economic aspect because lower
liquidity shocks reduce the investors’ expected return, and thus reduce the cost of eq-
uity capital. Answering this question might shed light on the reasons why order ﬂow




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)86 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
To test this hypothesis, we perform the following cross-sectional regression:
sdLIQi = b0 + b1logMCAPi + b2logAVGNbrTri + b3PRICEinvi
+ b4VOLTYi + b5FreeFloati + #i, (4.11)
where sdLIQi is the standard deviation of daily liquidity and price impact measures.
We use the same control variables as in regression equation (4.7).
Results can be found in Table 4.6. We see, similarly to regression (4.7), the control
variables have the expected sign. Liquidity and price impact volatility decreases with
market capitalization and average trading volume, and with FreeFloat. It increases
with stock price volatility. But the coefﬁcient of PRICEinv is not statistically signif-
icant for the standard deviation of quoted spread (model (1)) and effective spread
(model (5)). It is statistically signiﬁcant, though, for the standard deviation of per-
manent price impact (model (9)). Most importantly, the coefﬁcient of the dummy
variable is negative and strongly signiﬁcant in models (2), (6) and (10), meaning that
ﬁrms with an active upstairs market have a lower variations in liquidity. Selectivity-
adjusted regressions conﬁrms, and even strengthens, this result. The coefﬁcients of
BLKdum in models (4), (8) and (12) are large and highly signiﬁcant.11 These last re-
sults are an important explanation for the risk sharing role of the upstairs market
in the economy: if an active upstairs market helps to reduce liquidity shocks, then
investors are more willing to hold the asset.
The preceding results show that in the cross-sectional dimension, ﬁrms that have
anactiveupstairsmarkethavehigherliquidityandloweradverseselectionthanﬁrms
that do not trade by blocks. This contradicts the cream-skimming hypothesis. To
test more speciﬁcally the order ﬂow creation hypothesis, trading activity on the main
market was regressed on its determinants and on a block trading dummy. The results
show that stocks that have an active upstairs market are not more actively traded on
the main market than stocks that do not have block trades. Finally, we tested the
hypothesis that having an active upstairs market helps to reduce liquidity shocks.
To analyze this hypothesis, we regressed liquidity and price impact standard devia-
tion on explanatory variables and on a block trading dummy. The results show that
stocks with an active upstairs market have a more stable liquidity and price impact
(i.e. lower standard deviation) compared to stocks that do not have upstairs trades.
These results show the cross-sectional difference between ﬁrms that have block
trades and ﬁrms that do not. The next section will focus on stocks that have an active
upstairs market and will explore the dynamics of liquidity and trading over the days.
This will allow us to investigate whether the substitution hypothesis and the order
creation hypothesis hold on a daily basis.
11The ﬁrst stage probit regression for the selectivity-adjusted regression is the same as in regression


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































088 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
4.6 Time series results
We now turn to the panel VAR model in order to analyze the dynamics between trad-
ing activity downstairs and upstairs, and liquidity. We add the (daily) absolute return
for each stock because it is an important variable that explains variance of trading and
liquidity across days, within each company.
For Hypothesis 3, the vector of variables in the VAR speciﬁcation is comprised
of the following variables: absolute return (AbsR), effective spread (ES) on the main
market, the log of the number of trades on the main market (logNbrTr), and the log
of the number of block trades (logNbrBlk). The usual AIC, SBIC and HQIC informa-
tion criteria for lag selection suggested to use 3 lags. The econometric methodology
used to estimate the model is iterated seemingly unrelated regressions (see Lütke-
pohl, 2005).
The estimated coefﬁcients of the model are shown in Table 4.7 (the intercept in
each equation is omitted). In the table, the c2 statistics are tests of overall ﬁt of each
equation. The coefﬁcients in each equation are all jointly different from zero, meaning
that the variables are important in explaining the dependent variable.
To analyze the possible substitution effect between upstairs and downstairs due
to liquidity (Hypothesis 3a), we analyze the second and the fourth equation, namely
the effective spread and number of block trades equations. We see that although the
R2’s are non negligible (15.67 and 4.71%, respectively), there is no signiﬁcant effect
of number of block trades on effective spreads, and of effective spread on number of
block trades. This is a ﬁrst sign that investors do not route their orders upstairs when
liquidity downstairs is low.
Now looking at the third and fourth equation, to see how upstairs and downstairs
number of trades are related (Hypothesis 3b), we see that the number of upstairs
trades are positively associated with number of downstairs trades. The coefﬁcients of
number of block trades in the third equation are positive and signiﬁcant (except for
the third lag), and the coefﬁcients of number of downstairs trades in the fourth equa-
tion are positive and signiﬁcant (except the third lag). This shows that upstairs and
downstairs trading are complement and not substitute. These results are consistent
with order creation and risk sharing.
The importance of lags of the 4 variables in explaining the dynamics of each vari-
able is best shown in a table of Granger causality tests. Table 4.8 shows the test statis-
tics of a Granger causality test for each variable. The entries in the table are to be
read as being a test of Granger causality of the row variable to the column variable,
i.e. entry (i, j) states whether variable i Granger causes variable j. As it turns out, all
variables have a bi-directional Granger causality, except the pair logNbrBlk-ES where
no Granger causality can be seen. This supports the ﬁnding above that downstairs
liquidity does not impact upstairs trading, and vice versa.
The effect of an exogenous shock of a variable on the other variables of the systemCHAPTER 4 89
Table 4.7: Estimation result of the panel VAR related to Hypothesis 3
This is the estimation results of the VAR. The stocks included are those that have block trades during the
sample period (278 stocks). The total number of observations is 16,283. Variables are deﬁned in Table
4.1.
Equation Lag 1 (P-value) Lag 2 (P-value) Lag 3 (P-value)
1: AbsR AbsR 0.0836 (0.000) 0.0079 (0.376) 0.0151 (0.086)
ES 0.4214 (0.000) 0.0103 (0.908) 0.1907 (0.026)
logNbrTr 0.1578 (0.000) -0.0183 (0.477) 0.0187 (0.433)
logNbrBlk 0.0564 (0.061) 0.0392 (0.198) -0.0700 (0.020)
R2 0.0210
c2 349.43 (0.000)
2: ES AbsR 0.0037 (0.000) 0.0018 (0.030) 0.0009 (0.276)
ES 0.3032 (0.000) 0.1092 (0.000) 0.0596 (0.000)
logNbrTr -0.0023 (0.318) -0.0067 (0.005) -0.0023 (0.301)
logNbrBlk -0.0010 (0.719) 0.0004 (0.875) -0.0017 (0.541)
R2 0.1567
c2 3024.74 (0.000)
3: logNbrTr AbsR 0.0396 (0.000) -0.0047 (0.141) -0.0077 (0.015)
ES -0.1514 (0.000) -0.0596 (0.063) -0.1156 (0.000)
logNbrTr 0.3283 (0.000) 0.1058 (0.000) 0.0959 (0.000)
logNbrBlk 0.0331 (0.002) 0.0212 (0.052) 0.0033 (0.759)
R2 0.2427
c2 5217.45 (0.000)
4: logNbrBlk AbsR 0.0067 (0.004) 0.0004 (0.869) 0.0040 (0.082)
ES -0.0164 (0.468) 0.0175 (0.457) 0.0039 (0.863)
logNbrTr 0.0162 (0.013) 0.0227 (0.001) 0.0020 (0.752)
logNbrBlk 0.1401 (0.000) 0.0743 (0.000) 0.0649 (0.000)
R2 0.0471
c2 805.69 (0.000)
Table 4.8: Granger causality test for Hypothesis 3
This table shows the Granger causality tests. The upper number is the c2 statistic of the test. The table
should be read as follows. The entry (i, j) is a test of whether the variable in row i Granger-causes the
variable in column j. P-values are shown between brackets. Variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
AbsR ES logNbrTr logNbrBlk
AbsR 27.08 159.68 11.51
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
ES 39.63 71.37 0.93
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.819)
logNbrTr 48.57 19.13 31.99
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
logNbrBlk 9.80 0.54 16.19
(P-value) (0.020) (0.909) (0.001)90 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
can be seen through an orthogonalized impulse-response function. We thus show in
Figure 4.2 the diagrams. The ordering of the variables is AbsR, ES, logNbrTr, logN-
brBlk. Looking at the sub-graph entitled “VAR1: logNbrBlk –> ES” and the opposite
one “VAR1: ES –> logNbrBlk”, we see that there is no signiﬁcant effect between the
two variables.
To come back to Hypothesis 3b, which asks whether low trading on the main mar-
ket is associated with high trading upstairs, we see from the graphs “VAR1: logNbr-
Blk –> lobNbrTr” and its counterpart that the relation is positive: larger trading in
one market induces investors to trade more on the other market as well. The effect
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Granger causality tests shown above are tests of the null hypothesis that there
is no dynamic relationship between two variables. But it might be that there is a con-
temporaneous correlation between two variables, which is not well captured by the
Granger causality test. For this reason, we show the correlation matrix of residuals,
and we test whether the correlation is zero. This is especially relevant for effective
spread (ES) and block trades (logNbrBlk) pair. The correlation matrix relative to the
VAR estimated in Hypothesis 3 is shown in Table 4.9.
The t statistic associated with each correlation coefﬁcient is computed as follows.
First, compute the residuals from the VAR regression, for each variable in the system.
Call these residuals ri,t, where i identiﬁes the equation in the system. The correlation





n   2, (4.12)
where n is the number of observations.
The interpretation of the results is the following. The correlation between residuals
from the effective spread (ES) equation and the block trading equation (logNbrBlk) in
Hypothesis 3 is very low (less than 0.001 in absolute value), and its corresponding
t statistic is also low (-0.34). This means that there is no signiﬁcant contemporane-
ous correlation between the two variables. This is a further evidence that there is no
substitution effect between downstairs liquidity and upstairs trading.
In the same table, we see that we have a positive correlation coefﬁcient between
upstairs trading and downstairs trading (0.12), with a t statistic of more than 15. This
means that shocks on upstairs trading are positively (and signiﬁcantly) correlated
with shock on downstairs trading. This further shows that there is no substitution
effect between upstairs and downstairs trading.
4.6.1 After-hours block trades
We now use the same methodology to analyze the trading activity in the upstairs
market after normal trading hours. Hypothesis 4a asks whether on days where liq-
uidity is low, after-hours trading activity is higher, and Hypothesis 4b asks whether
downstairs order ﬂow and after-hours upstairs order ﬂow are substitute. To analyze
this, we separate upstairs trading activity into two different variables: logNbrBlkDH
is the log of the number of block trades during normal market hours, and logNbr-
BlkAH is the log of the number of block trades that occur after normal trading hours.
The resulting vector now has ﬁve variables: in addition to logNbrBlkDH and logNbr-
BlkAH, we have AbsR, the absolute return of the company in question; ES, the daily
effective spread; and logNbrTr, the log of the number of trades on the main market.
The information criteria suggest to use 3 lags. Again, a forward orthogonal devi-
ation is used on every variable for every panel. The estimated coefﬁcients and the94 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
usual goodness of ﬁt statistics are shown in Table 4.10.
In Table 4.10, equation 3 (ES) and equation 5 (logNbrBlkAH), we see from the es-
timated coefﬁcients that there is no signiﬁcant effect of downstairs liquidity on after-
hours block trading. This is conﬁrmed by the Granger causality tests shown in Table
4.11: downstairs effective spread does not Granger-cause after-hours block trading.
And vice versa: after-hours block trading does not Granger-cause downstairs liquid-
ity. These results give further support to the previous ﬁndings that the upstairs and
downstairs markets are not substitute: investors do not route their orders upstairs
when liquidity is low on the main market.
Now looking at equations 2 in Table 4.10, we see that the coefﬁcients of after-hours
upstairs trading on the downstairs trading equation are insigniﬁcant. But in equa-
tion 5, the coefﬁcients of downstairs trading in the after-hours block trading equa-
tion are signiﬁcant at the second and third lag, and in opposite sign. The resulting
effect is thus ambiguous. The Granger causality tests (see Table 4.11) show that in-
deed, the after-hours block trades do not Granger-cause downstairs trading, but that
downstairs trading Granger-causes after-hours block trades. We have to look at the
orthogonal impulse-response functions to see the sign of the effect.
The orthogonalized impulse-response function is shown in Figure 4.3. The order-
ing of the variables is absolute return (AbsR), number of trades downstairs (logN-
brTr), effective spread (ES), number of block trades during normal hours (logNbr-
BlrDH), and number of trades after normal trading hours (logNbrBlrAH). This or-
dering is the natural order to analyze the effect of liquidity on after-hours trading
because liquidity is measured on the main market during normal trading hours, thus
before the number of after-hours upstairs block trades are observed.
Consistent with the results from the Granger causality tests, we see no signiﬁcant
effect from effective spread to after-hours upstairs trading. This shows that investors
do not systematically substitute their order ﬂow to the upstairs market when liquid-
ity is low on the main market. This result goes against the substitution hypothesis.
From the graphs, we see also that a positive shock in downstairs trading (logNbrTr)
inﬂuences positively the number of block trades after hours. This is consistent with
the order creation hypothesis.CHAPTER 4 95
Table 4.9: Correlation matrix of residuals – Hypothesis 3
This table shows correlation matrix of residuals from the VAR estimated in Hypothesis 3. T statistics are





t stat (64.86) (-9.92)
logNbrBlk 0.10 -0.00 0.12
t stat (13.01) (-0.34) (15.19)96 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
Table 4.10: Estimation result of the panel VAR related to Hypothesis 4
This is the estimation results of the VAR. The stocks included are those that have block trades both
during normal trading hours and after normal hours (195 stocks). The total number of observations is
11,497. Variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
Equation Variable Lag 1 (P-value) Lag 2 (P-value) Lag 3 (P-value)
1: AbsR AbsR 0.0626 (0.000) 0.0170 (0.116) 0.0212 (0.047)
logNbrTr 0.1497 (0.000) -0.0259 (0.450) 0.0583 (0.064)
ES 0.4398 (0.002) -0.0205 (0.890) 0.3474 (0.015)
logNbrBlkDH 0.0401 (0.176) 0.0200 (0.502) -0.0310 (0.295)
logNbrBlkAH 0.0406 (0.303) 0.0136 (0.733) -0.1312 (0.001)
R2 0.0168
c2 196.02 (0.000)
2: logNbrTr AbsR 0.0369 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.945) -0.0031 (0.373)
logNbrTr 0.3372 (0.000) 0.0844 (0.000) 0.0978 (0.000)
ES -0.1359 (0.004) -0.0944 (0.052) -0.1024 (0.028)
logNbrBlkDH 0.0345 (0.000) 0.0124 (0.202) 0.0100 (0.301)
logNbrBlkAH 0.0085 (0.512) 0.0140 (0.282) -0.0165 (0.201)
R2 0.2476
c2 3783.64 (0.000)
3: ES AbsR 0.0034 (0.000) 0.0017 (0.017) 0.0005 (0.452)
logNbrTr -0.0019 (0.375) -0.0055 (0.016) -0.0028 (0.180)
ES 0.2868 (0.000) 0.0847 (0.000) 0.0708 (0.000)
logNbrBlkDH -0.0003 (0.866) -0.0007 (0.715) -0.0003 (0.870)
logNbrBlkAH -0.0010 (0.699) 0.0005 (0.861) -0.0002 (0.953)
R2 0.1377
c2 1835.22 (0.000)
4: logNbrBlkDH AbsR 0.0056 (0.103) -0.0033 (0.346) 0.0001 (0.972)
logNbrTr 0.0268 (0.011) 0.0127 (0.248) 0.0208 (0.038)
ES -0.0337 (0.461) 0.0106 (0.822) -0.0151 (0.740)
logNbrBlkDH 0.1316 (0.000) 0.1045 (0.000) 0.0820 (0.000)
logNbrBlkAH 0.0566 (0.000) 0.0328 (0.010) 0.0204 (0.105)
R2 0.0630
c2 773.19 (0.000)
5: logNbrBlkAH AbsR 0.0032 (0.214) 0.0041 (0.111) 0.0067 (0.009)
logNbrTr 0.0078 (0.319) 0.0267 (0.001) -0.0169 (0.025)
ES 0.0208 (0.544) 0.0330 (0.351) -0.0216 (0.527)
logNbrBlkDH 0.0236 (0.001) -0.0028 (0.698) 0.0153 (0.031)
logNbrBlkAH 0.0881 (0.000) 0.0305 (0.001) 0.0221 (0.019)
R2 0.0186
c2 217.84 (0.000)CHAPTER 4 97
Table 4.11: Granger causality test for Hypothesis 4
This table shows the Granger causality tests. The upper number is the c2 statistic of the test. The table
should be read as follows. The entry (i, j) is a test of whether the variable in row i Granger-causes the
variable in column j. P-values are shown between brackets. Variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
AbsR logNbrTr ES logNbrBlkDH logNbrBlkAH
AbsR 109.31 28.68 3.53 11.20
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.011)
logNbrTr 30.28 17.19 23.60 15.58
P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ES 20.07 29.60 0.73 1.72
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.867) (0.633)
logNbrBlkDH 3.16 18.92 0.24 17.93
P-value (0.367) (0.000) (0.970) (0.000)
logNbrBlkAH 11.92 3.08 0.17 33.55
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Thelaststepofthisempiricalinvestigationistolookattheresidualstotestwhether
there is a contemporaneous effect between liquidity and after-hours block trading on
one hand, and between downstairs trading and after-hours block trading on the other
hand. Results are shown in Table 4.12. The correlation coefﬁcient between shocks on
effective spread and both during and after-hours upstairs trading is close to zero and
insigniﬁcant. Also, the correlation coefﬁcient between shock of downstairs trading
and both during and after-hours are positive and signiﬁcant (although the latter is
small). Once again, these results show that there is no substitution effect between
upstairs and downstairs trading. This further evidence in favor of the risk-sharing
hypothesis.
Overall, the results show that the effect of an upstairs market is not to deviate, or
substitute, uninformed order ﬂow away from the main market. On the contrary, it
increases trading on the main market. The upstairs market is a complementary venue
for investors, and the existence of this trading venue allows market participants to
trade more. At the same time, it reduces variations in liquidity, and thus liquidity
risk. Some robustness checks are provided in the next section, and the conclusion
will follow.
Before to end this section, a word about robustness is in order. First, concerning
Hypothesis 3, since the orthogonalized impulse-response function is sensitive to the
ordering of the variables, we tried with the opposite ordering. The results are qualita-
tively similar. Also, since the results from the panel VAR model above use only stocks
that have an active upstairs market, we tried the same model but for stocks without
block trades to see if the general dynamics between downstairs trading, liquidity and
return is similar. Results were almost identical.
From the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.2, we see that although the pro-
portion of total volume exchanged upstairs is similar, the number of days with block
trades is quite different between size categories. For this reason, the dynamic relation-
ship between liquidity and block trading might be different between size classes. To
investigate this, we tried to divide the sample of ﬁrms into three sub-samples accord-
ing to market capitalization. The panel VAR estimated above was performed again
separately on each sub-sample. The results were qualitatively the same as with the
full sample, and that the conclusions hold.
All the results for these robustness checks are available upon request.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of fragmentation of order ﬂow between two
different markets: a main market, which is an electronic limit order book market,
and an upstairs market for large blocks, which is operated mostly over-the-counter
by stock brokers. We investigated whether the existence of an active upstairs market
had an effect on liquidity on the main market (and vice versa). We wanted to answerCHAPTER 4 101
the main question of whether order ﬂow fragmentation reduces or increases liquidity.
The answer to this question is relevant both from the academic market microstructure
literature (because the effect of order ﬂow fragmentation is not well understood), and
for policy (is it a good for the economy to allow more trading venues to open?)
The main results of the empirical analysis using Euronext Paris liquidity and trad-
ing data show that order ﬂow fragmentation between the upstairs block market does
not affect negatively liquidity on the main market. On the contrary, stocks that have
an active upstairs market have higher liquidity, even after controlling for the known
determinants of liquidity.
In order to investigate the effect of fragmentation of liquidity, we tested four hy-
potheses. The main ﬁndings are that on the cross-section, order ﬂow fragmentation
(i.e. an active upstairs market) increases the level of liquidity (Hypothesis 1). This
means that order ﬂow fragmentation does not cream-skim the main market by rout-
ing upstairs uninformed orders. However, the cross-sectional analysis did not show
that market fragmentation allows investors to trade more (Hypothesis 2). That is,
fragmentation does not lead to order creation. But in any case, fragmentation does
not reduce the volume traded on the main market.
These results were conﬁrmed in the time series dimension using a panel vector
autoregression model. This approach showed that even from one day to another, the
upstairs market does not act as a substitute for the downstairs market when trad-
ing conditions are difﬁcult, i.e. when liquidity is low. In addition, we saw that when
downstairs trading is higher than usual, the upstairs market is also more active (Hy-
pothesis 3 and 4). This shows that the downstairs and upstairs market act as a com-
plement to each other, and are not substitutes.
Finally, to better understand the reasons behind the order ﬂow creation and risk
sharing effect of upstairs market, we investigated whether an active upstairs market
was related to lower liquidity shocks. The typical investor dislikes large variations
in liquidity, as shown in the asset pricing literature. We found that in average, stocks
with an active upstairs market have lower liquidity shocks, as proxied by the variance
in daily liquidity. This is an important result, new in the literature, that suggests
that the complementarity between upstairs and downstairs markets help to reduce
liquidity shocks. In turn, this reduces the risk of these stocks.
With MiFID in application in Europe, and RegNMS in the US, we have witnessed
during the last years the creation of many new trading venues that compete with the
old monopolist markets. However, these new markets do not have the same design
as the upstairs market for block trades. This warrants more research about the effect
of market fragmentation. Does competition with these new trading platforms, like
crossing networks or electronic communication networks, also induce order ﬂow cre-
ation? What is the effect of market design in the ability of competing markets to foster
risk sharing in the economy?102 BLOCK TRADES AND MARKET LIQUIDITY ON EURONEXT PARIS
Table 4.12: Correlation matrix of residuals – Hypothesis 4
This table shows correlation matrix of residuals from the VAR estimated in Hypothesis 4. T statistics are
shown between brackets. The number of observations is 11,497. Variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
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